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INTRODUCTION
Why say "Inside every fat person there is a thin person waiting to get out."
For me, it's more like "Inside every fat person there is an even fatter person
waiting get out."'
In its now famous paragraph from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 the Supreme Court tried to delineate the scope of liberty
that the Constitution guarantees:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State . . . .3
As one would expect from a text that takes on the considerable task of
outlining the scope of liberty, the Court's words are emotive. They seem to
convey a sense of the core dimensions of being and the amalgam of perspectives,
choices, and practices that make individuals who they are. These are components
so personal and vulnerable that the government should refrain from interfering
with them. The Court's conceptual framework concerning abortion here is useful
when we try to determine the scope of constitutionally protected liberty, because
it invokes an intuition about the most basic and private aspects of our lives-
those aspects that are most one's own and should not require any explanation or
be subjected to any State intervention. What else in life, like the decision about
whether to have an abortion, lies at the heart of liberty in that it defines one's
concept of existence, of meaning, and of the mystery of human lives? What other
views, choices, and ways of living should not be "formed under compulsion of
the state?" While some rights, such as free speech or religious freedom, clearly
fall within this protected realm, there are territories of human existence that also
lie at the heart of our liberty and define how we live, but are yet to be recognized
as such by constitutional theory.
In this Article, I visit one such uncharted territory and argue that American
law should recognize a new realm of liberty: the realm of body size. Recognizing
1. Thanks to Kenji Yoshino for sharing this quote (from a friend).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
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the right to be any body size as part of the general principle of liberty (and, more
specifically, as part of autonomy and dignity) would entail that we cautiously
scrutinize governmental policies aiming to create incentives for losing weight or
deterrence against gaining weight, as well as some acts by private actors, and
balance them vis-d-vis their potential infringement of the right. My principal
contention is that the law has been blind to body size and shape, eating habits,
and movement and exercise practices, due to a dualistic understanding of the
relationship between mind and body.4 However, decisions pertaining to these
domains of experience lie at the core of human existence, no less so than
questions such as whether to become a parent, which church to join, or what
views to hold and express. Due to economic, technological, and cultural changes,
body size and the practices associated with it (such as dieting, exercising, and
surgery) have become more meaningful in the lives of American legal subjects
than ever before. Body size plays a role in shaping individual and social identity,'
but also it has become a central arena for policymakers, who routinely recruit the
law in creating regulative instruments to encourage the slimming down of the
U.S. population.
From the perspective of constitutional theory, legal instruments that
encourage weight control are today construed as benign. To date, no legal scholar
has argued that either legally mandated measures, such as regularly weighing
school pupils to document their weight and recommend dietary and exercise
measures, or the absence of body weight as a suspect category in
antidiscrimination law constitutes an illegitimate violation of liberty.6 Typically,
legal measures of this nature are not discussed in the context of liberty, as they
seem harmless and even welcomed in "the war against obesity."
4. Dualistic approaches view the body and the mind as distinct substances. For an elaboration
see infra Section IlIl.A.
5. There are important gendered aspects to the social meaning of body size. Since women's
physical appearance is more critically scrutinized in western culture, women are more susceptible
to social sanctions for body sizes that deviate from conventions of the ideal body. This Article
consciously employs a nongendered, general approach in conceptualizing the ;ight to any body
size, as it should be a right enjoyed both by men and women. However, there is undoubtedly room
for further research on the different impact of weight-centered legal policies on men and women.
Some classic accounts of the importance of body image and size, eating practices, and identity for
women include SusAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT (1993); KIM CHERNIN, THE HUNGRY SELF:
WOMEN, EATING, AND IDENTITY (1994); and SUSIE ORBACH, FAT IS A FEMINIST ISSUE (2010). See
also MICHAEL GARD & JAN WRIGHT, THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND IDEOLOGY
153-67 (2005); Yofi Tirosh, Weighty Speech: Addressing Body Size in the Classroom, 28 REV.
EDUC. PEDAGOGY & CULTURAL STUD. 267 (2006). For empirical evidence demonstrating that
women's wages are more adversely impacted due to their "overweight" than men's wages, see the
sources cited in Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Legal Largesse or Big Fat Failure: Do Weight-
Discrimination Laws Improve Employment Outcomes for the Obese? 31 n.94 (Jan. 14, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1985371.
6. On "fat people's liminal position outside civil rights protections," see Anna Kirkland, Think
of the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance, 42 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 397, 425
(2008).
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Indeed, as I will show below, it is unsurprising that we have not yet
recognized weight-related laws and policies as raising questions pertaining to
liberty, since our jurisprudence has developed within the Western tradition of
negating the body as secondary and inferior to the mind. This tradition has
rendered it difficult for the law to identify the body as a domain of rights.
However, it is time to take the body, and particularly body size, seriously as a
subject of rights and as a domain that should be free from governmental (and in
certain cases also societal) interference.
Thus far, weight has been discussed in legal scholarship mainly through the
framework of discrimination. In the past decade, the debate about whether
weight should be a protected category of antidiscrimination law has become
increasingly vibrant. Scholarly legal commentators who argue that weight should
be a protected category, either in itself or as part of disability discrimination,
have based their argument on two main strategies: questioning the rooted belief
that weight is a voluntary and mutable characteristic' and critically examining the
7. See ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 6 (2008)
(mapping the possibilities of protecting weight discrimination under prevailing antidiscrimination
law by "[e]xamining antidiscrimination law from both the center and the edges"); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 102 (2010) (arguing
that weight-based discrimination is the most common form of appearance discrimination and that
the law should take part in preventing it); SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE:
FIGHTING WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION 233-38 (2000) (using the lens of discrimination to
analyze legally various manifestations of fat oppression); Jane Byeff Kom, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25,
50-68 (1997) [hereinafter Korn, Fat] (arguing that obesity should be recognized as a disability
under the Americans With Disabilities Act's antidiscrimination protections); Jane Kom, Too Fat,
17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & LAW 209, 242-44 (2011) [hereinafter Kom, Too Fat] (suggesting that the
2009 amendment to the ADA, the ADAAA, may not provide sufficient protection for weight
discrimination); Karen M. Kramer & Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the
Workplace: Protection Through a Perceived Disability Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 41, 52-64 (1994); Elizabeth E. Theran, "Free
To Be Arbitrary and. . . Capricious ": Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 113, 148-53 (2001); Donald L. Bierman,
Jr., Comment, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be a
Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 951, 958-59, 971-75 (1990); Brenda K.
DeVries, Note, Health Should Not Be a Determinative Factor of Whether One Will Be a Suitable
Adoptive Parent, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 137 (2009) (arguing that obesity should not disqualify
potential adopting parents from eligibility to adopt); Elizabeth Kristen, Comment, Addressing the
Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REv. 57, 71-100 (2002); Karol V.
Mason, Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 337,
355-61 (1982); Bruce 1. Shapiro, Comment, The Heavy Burden of Establishing Weight as a
Handicap Under Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L. REv. 565, 575-77 (1991); William
C. Taussig, Comment, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a
Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REv.
927, 956-63 (1994).
8. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 104-05 (discussing the low success rates of diets); id. at 39-41
(presenting the health risks associated with dieting); SOLOVAY, supra note 7, at 190-209 (discussing
the immutability of weight and the dangers of dieting); Kom, Fat, supra note 7, at 44-48 (citing
268
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seemingly well-known linkage between fat and health risks.9 These lines of
arguments are good strategies in the antidiscrimination context. Since suspect
classifications in antidiscrimination law are usually of immutable traits,
demonstrating that weight is not as changeable as is frequently assumed supports
the claim that it should be a forbidden ground for discrimination. Similarly, if a
large body is not as unhealthy as is commonly thought, then the number of cases
in which body weight constitutes a relevant difference is significantly reduced.
While discussing body size in the context of antidiscrimination law is important,
this Article maintains that the antidiscrimination framework is insufficient. Body
size raises challenges beyond the question of preventing discriminatory treatment
because it is intrinsically worthy of protection in and of itself and not merely as a
suspect classification. The size of one's body is an intimate feature of human
experience. It touches the core of one's person, much like speech or religious
faith. It thus merits more than what the antidiscrimination framework provides,
which is the duty to be tolerant to certain differences. The law must develop a
vocabulary that will enable respecting the sphere of body size and will restrict
direct and indirect regulation to the necessary minimum. Thus, this Article takes
an innovative approach: rather than relying on empirical data about the causes
and effects of fat, it addresses the question of individual weight from a rights
perspective and asks whether weight can and should be understood as a matter of
liberty, alongside other deontologically based'o fundamental rights. This inquiry
sources that challenge the socially pervasive belief that weight is a matter of willpower and self
control). But see Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 7, at 65-67 (reviewing scientific evidence that
obesity is not a voluntary condition); Bierman, supra note 7, at 957 (citing medical and
psychological causes for obesity, which are beyond the individual's control); DeVries, supra note
7, at 150-53 (reviewing the nature-nurture debate on obesity factors); Kristen, supra note 7, at 69
(surveying medical data indicating that "it is not clear that fat people can do anything about their
size"); Mason, supra note 7, at 346 ("In most cases, (weight] losses are only short term, despite the
claims of weight-loss clinics, diet books, and drug producers."); Taussig, supra note 7, at 930-32
(reviewing medical research on the genetic causes of obesity); Lucy Wang, Note, Weight
Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?, 117 YALE L.J. 1900, 1906-08 (2008) (discussing the
role of genetics in obesity); Tali Schaefer, Off Their Fat Backs! 25-28 (May 25, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that "genetics are the most important cause of obesity,
likely accounting for as much as forty to seventy percent of the variation in weight" and reviewing
the research supporting this conclusion).
9. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 41 ("[F]rom a health perspective, the current obsession with
weight is misdirected."); Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 7, at 70 ("[M]odern research shows that
[it] is actually the effect of the diet cycle on the body, not extra pounds, that leads to health
problems."); Theran, supra note 7, at 148-53 (referring to the complex and mixed medical evidence
about the physiological causes and effects of fat); Bierman, supra note 7, at 958 ("[A]mbiguities
remain whether a causal relationship exists between the obesity and the medical condition.");
DeVries, supra note 7, at 154-55 ("[]t is important to recognize that not all overweight people are
unhealthy."); Kristen, supra note 7, at 67-69 ("Despite popular conceptions that being fat is
dangerously unhealthy, the picture painted by the medical literature is not so clear."); Schaefer,
supra note 8, at 33-50 (arguing that many of the assumptions about the benefit of weight loss and
about the psychological and physiological harm of fat are flawed).
10. By saying that the philosophical basis of the right to be fat will be deontological, I mean
269
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will lead to the conclusion that we should answer this question with an
unequivocal "yes."
The debate about the meaning of empirical data on obesity serves primarily
utilitarian, instrumentalist arguments. Therefore, suspending the effects of these
debates is important for addressing the question of liberty as "purely" as possible
in developing a deontological basis for the right to be fat. Hence, I will assume,
for the sake of argument and despite compelling data to the contrary, that weight
is indeed a characteristic within the control of the person-a matter of willpower,
discipline, and chosen lifestyle. I will further assume that being fat" is damaging
to one's health, although there is also a growing vein of critique of this view. In
other words, I will assume that being fat is, from a health perspective, not an
optimal lifestyle choice. And yet, mutability and health risks notwithstanding, I
will argue for the freedom to occupy a body of any size by re-conceptualizing it
within the domain of personhood-a domain in which a jurisprudence based on
basic liberties in the classic liberal tradition would dictate that government and
fellow citizens should not intervene.
The gist of my argument is that the dominant response to growing obesity
rates has been to seek a solution to the obesity epidemic in getting people to lose
weight or refrain from gaining it. But a complementary response must be to re-
examine our biases concerning weight and our difficulty in recognizing the
importance of corporeal existence. The necessary change is located as much on a
social, political, legal, and ethical level as it is on a physiological level.
that the justification of the right should be rooted in the right's intrinsic value and should not
depend on establishing that protecting this right will promote some independent account of welfare.
Sometimes, choices or rules that will bring about good results are still morally wrong and should be
rejected. For deontologists, as opposed to consequentalists, "what makes a choice right is its
conformity with a moral norm," and the right has a priority over the good. Larry Alexander &
Michael Moore, Deonthological Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Nov. 11,
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/ethics-deontological/. Making a
deontological argument to justify the right to be fat means that we should examine whether it is
justifiable to limit people's freedom to be fat notwithstanding the positive outcomes that might
result from such a policy (although infra Section II.C argues that making a utilitarian argument to
justify pro-thinness policies is not as easy a task as it may seem).
11. Throughout this Article I prefer the term "fat" to "overweight," "obese," or "morbidly
obese." The terms I reject rest on the medical understanding of fatness, an understanding that, for
reasons I will explain in this Article, I believe should be treated with caution. Indeed, "fat" is
currently a derogative term in our culture, and I imagine that for many readers using this word in a
law review article sounds inappropriately blunt. As prominent "fat advocate" Marylin Wann puts it,
fat is the new F-word. Marylin Wann, Fat Studies: An Invitation to Revolution, Forward to THE
FAT STUDIES READER, at ix, xii (Esther Rothblum & Sondra Solovay eds., 2009). Yet "fat" is the
term used by identity politics groups who seek to empower and reaffirm big-bodied people and
inject the term with positive meaning. See, e.g., NAAFA-NATIONAL ASSOCIATION To ADVANCE
FAT ACCEPTANCE, http://www.naafaonline.com/dev2 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). The growing
academic field of fat studies chose to use "fat" and not "obese," "big," or "heavy" as its main
signifier, in order to convey its critical standpoint regarding the pejoratization of this term. See,
e.g., Wann, supra, at xii; FAT!SO?, http://www.fatso.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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To many, being fat might seem unhealthy, aesthetically unappealing, costly
to the individual and to society, and even immoral. Yet the law should not serve
as an instrument for limiting fat people's access to basic liberties and to equal
opportunities as it currently does-by creating incentives for weight loss and
allowing private actors to express preferences not to employ fat persons, or by
refusing to sell them health insurance or an airline ticket. In serving as an
instrument to limit fat persons' access to rights and opportunities, American law
reaches the most intimate areas of personal experience in ways that contradict the
basic tenants of its commitment to liberty. Why, what, and with whom we eat,
and how we exercise are such personal aspects of our existence that we should
not be required to give account of them-neither to the government nor to fellow
citizens.
Part I of this Article provides an inventory of the ways in which the law
intervenes in the body size of its subjects. This review will demonstrate that
fatness has become, in our culture and our law, a marker of a coherent set of
personality traits. This Part also explains what I mean when I say that today there
is no legal recognition of the right to be fat and how the legal discourse on weight
is governed by the medical understanding of obesity. Part II reviews current
research that challenges the predominant scientific and popular convictions that
weight is within an individual's control and that being fat is counterproductive to
one's health. This Part also temporarily abandons the a priori justification of the
right to be fat and maps the utilitarian justifications for this right.
Part III provides the theoretical background to the argument that weight
should be included in the scope of liberty by discussing the philosophical
tradition of mind-body dualism, its contemporary deconstructions, and one of its
alternatives, namely, the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. Rather than
seeing fatness as an identity that is grounded in an imagined future and a
lamented past with no possibility for a fat present, phenomenological accounts
allow positive conceptions of the fat body as, among other things, a body that can
be a subject of rights.
Part IV outlines the contours of the right to be fat and applies it to concrete
legal issues. For example, it considers what legitimate policies the government
can still promote in light of the right to be fat, whether it should be permissible
for airlines to charge fat people for two seats, and whether weight should be a
protected category under employment discrimination law. This Part also
addresses the implication of my arguments for the legal regulation of dangerous
behaviors and expensive tastes such as smoking or skydiving.
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I. FAT MANIFESTATIONS IN LAW
[T]he body is uniquely "personal and political."l 2
Discussions of the "obesity epidemic"l 3 have become ubiquitous. The media
covers this issue extensively. The public is constantly warned by medical and
nutritional experts, economists, and educators that we are becoming heavier, that
overweight kills, and that something must be done immediately.14 We are told
that growing obesity rates threaten to cast an unbearable burden on medical costs,
to reduce the productivity of sedentary workers who suffer from lack of
willpower and self-control, and even to diminish the ethics of the social body,
which has lost its disciplined character by surrendering to gluttony and laziness.' 5
The anti-fat craze does not remain on the policy level, but infiltrates both
culture and law. Culturally, fat people are represented in the media as laughable
and miserable figures.' 6 They are socially marked as deviant and they experience
prejudice and harassment. The preconceptions they encounter might be
internalized, shaping their self-esteem such that it often reaches the core of their
identity. '7 As for the law, I present examples below illustrating how body size
12. Gowri Ramachandran, Against the Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human
Rights, 87 DENVER U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2009) (citation omitted).
13. For an account of the development of the notion of an "obesity epidemic" in America, see
J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT POLITICS: THE REAL STORY BEHIND AMERICA'S OBESITY EPIDEMIC 36-59
(2006).
14. A recent prominent example is First Lady Michelle Obama's initiatives to fight childhood
obesity, which include starting a vegetable garden at the White House, setting up exercise programs
for children, and lecturing restaurants on how to reduce fat content in their servings.
Notwithstanding this campaign, Ms. Obama herself stated that she never talks about her daughters'
weight in their presence, for fear of causing problems with their diet. See Mail Foreign Service,
Now First Lady Lectures Restaurants on Food Choice as She Steps Up Campaign Against
Childhood Obesity, MAILONLINE, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1311902/Michelle-Obama-lectures-US-restaurants-steps-childhood-obesity-campaign.html.
15. Sander Gilman discusses the link between citizens' weight and the health of the nation in
the past century: "Dieting. . . [has become] a way to halt the obesity epidemic, to intervene so as to
improve the private life of the individual and thus the health of the nation. . . . There were claims
that morbid obesity impacted on the health of the mother and child, and thus weakened the state."
SANDER L. GILMAN, FAT: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF OBESITY 4 (2008); see also SOLOVAY, supra
note 7, at 78-85 (discussing the prevalence of verbal abuse towards fat people in personal, public,
and professional settings).
16. See, e.g., Bradley S. Greenberg et al., Portrayals of Overweight and Obese Individuals on
Commercial Television, 93 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1342, 1346-47 (2003) (sampling episodes from top
prime-time fiction television and finding that fat individuals are under-represented by more than
half their percentage in the general population and that they are less likely to have positive
personality attributes); Susan M. Himes & J. Kevin Thompson, Fat Stigmatization in Television
Shows and Movies: A Content Analysis, 15 OBESITY 712, 715-16 (2007) (noting that fat
stigmatization is often presented in the form of commentary and humor through entertainment
media).
17. This is especially so in the case of women and girls. See generally JOAN JACOBS
BRUMBERG, THE BODY PROJECT: AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GIRLS (1997) (arguing that
272
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has become a relevant category in various areas. Weight plays a role in
determining access to employment opportunities, health services, and education,
and may impact the possibility of serving on juries. Weight also jeopardizes the
ability of fat people to sustain a sense of self-worth and entitlement to participate
in the full scope of civic and personal life.
A. Legal Manifestations of Body Size: An Overview
One way of characterizing the relationship between weight and the law is by
distinguishing between direct state interventions that burden the right to be fat,
and failures of the State to intervene in actions of private individuals or
institutions that burden the right to be fat. In the first category of positive, active
State intervention, I include features of the "war against obesity" that facilitate
various regimes meant to regulate weight and create legal instruments that
provide means for fighting the "obesity epidemic." In the second category, the
law is silent about weight even when it has become an insidious classification
that might merit legal attention.
Usually in the first category, the legal intervention arises after other
professional fields define a problem related to body weight and recruit the law to
enforce policy. For example, the medical profession points to a fat-related risk.
This risk is then echoed by public health officials, educators, or insurance
companies. Finally, after these sectors have developed schemes of action to
respond to the problem they named, we often find legal instruments are recruited
to execute policies by creating legal authorizations and institutional,
bureaucratized regulatory schemes.
Examples of State intervention include the following:
1) Laws mandating that schools weigh students on a regular basis and send
report cards to their parents, along with dietary and exercise recommendations.' 8
2) Designing, via case law, parental neglect standards that are related to
children's weight. Courts may mandate that welfare authorities remove extremely
fat children from the custody of their parents. The child's weight is considered a
for American girls, shaping the body is a central site for shaping one's selfhood).
18. For a recent weighing policy in an Arizona school district see Flagstaff Schools Send
Home Warnings About Overweight Students, THE DAILY COURIER, Nov. 14, 2010,
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionlD=1&SubsectionlD=I&ArticlelD=87494. For a report
on the pros and cons of such a program in the U.K. see Frances Elliot, Parents ofFat Children To
Be Given a Warning, TIMESONLINE, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/health/
articlel 880936.ece. For a critique of such programs, see Daniel Engber, Leave the Fat Kids Alone,
SLATE, Mar., 10, 2011, http://hive.slate.com/hive/time-to-trim/article/leave-the-fat-kids-alone
("Tell a little kid he's fat (or obese, or at elevated risk of obesity, or whatever clinical spin you put
on it) and you might help him to eat his fruits and veggies-but watch what happens to his bendy
little brain. Get in there early enough, and even the best intentions can metastasize into a deep-
seated anxiety. What happens in the mind of an adolescent could be inscribed there for years to
come.").
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primary indication of parental neglect and abuse, often overriding contrary
evidence of improvement in a child's health and lifestyle, such as lower blood
sugar and blood pressure.19
3) Denial of entitlements such as the right to graduate from college even if
one has successfully completed one's academic requirements. In late 2009, the
media reported a practice by Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, a state-related
university, which denied fat students the right to graduate after completing their
academic requirements unless they completed a fitness class (commonly referred
to as "the fat course") that met three times a week. 20 After the media exposure,
the school retreated, noting that this policy violated its commitment to equal
treatment. The class would now only be offered as an elective to relevant
students.21
4) Initiatives that are aimed at a specific segment of the population,
identified as one with high rates of obesity, to make it costly for them to buy junk
food or maintain other practices that are assumed to be in correlation with
fatness. New York City's Mayor Michael Bloomberg, for example, has been
promoting a ban on using food stamps to buy sugared soft drinks.22 As I explain
19. See Schaefer, supra note 8, at 36 ("The legal system sees weight and nothing else. So
much so, that courts ignore the actual health improvement that some of the children experience
when their diet and exercise habits change and see the parents as failing where they succeed in
ensuring a healthier-but not thinner-lifestyle for their children.") (second emphasis added); see
also SOLOVAY, supra note 7, at 64-77 (discussing removal of children from their parents' custody
due to children's weight); Theran, supra note 7, at 170-71 (reviewing weight-based discrimination
in family law and child custody). Obesity is also becoming a factor in custody cases. See Shauneen
M. Garrahan & Andrew W. Eichner, Tipping the Scale: A Place for Childhood Obesity in the
Evolving Legal Framework of Child Abuse and Neglect, 12 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHICS
336 (2012); Ashby Jones & Shirley S. Wang, Obesity Fuels Custody Fights, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405297020429450457661310090862981 0.html.
20. Kate Harding, You Must Be This Thin To Graduate, SALON.COM, Dec. 1, 2009,
http://www.salon.comlife/broadsheet/feature/2009/12/01/lincoln-university. Whether a university
is public or private will change the above classification of such a policy as a State act or a private
act. For further discussion of the divide between the government duty to respect the right to be fat
and the duty of private actors, see infra note 216.
21. AP, Pa. School Drops Required Fitness Class for Obese, Fox NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,579577,00.html. For a critique of the college practice, see
Susan Albers, Weighing College Students: Helpful or Harmful?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 21, 2009,
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/comfort-cravings/2009 11/weighing-college-students-
helpful-or-harmful (claiming the Lincoln University initiative did more harm than good, since it
created weight discrimination by suggesting that students with BMI over thirty are unhealthy in
comparison to thinner ones, an assumption that is incorrect). For data on the bias of instructors
against fat students, and on its negative effects on students' achievements, see Rebecca M. Puhl &
Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17 OBESITY 941, 949-50 (2009).
22. See Anemona Hartocollis, New York Asks To Bar Use of Food Stamps To Buy Sodas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/nyregion/07stamps.html. One reader
response to this article reads: "There is something very warped about the richest person in NYC
trying to prevent the poorest from drinking soda pop. The one who could, if he so desired, drink the
most expensive champagne instead of water, fixated on making sure the little people can't get their
hands on an Orange Crush." Dave, Comment to New York Asks To Bar Use of Food Stamps To Buy
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below,23 in light of the right to be fat we should question the legitimacy of such
initiatives, which directly target fat people. The picture is different, however,
with regard to initiatives aimed at the entire population, such as First Lady
Michelle Obama's bill setting more restrictions on what school cafeterias can
serve and offering them additional funding for serving healthier food.24 This bill,
and other general measures, such as food labeling regulations requiring that fast
25food restaurants specify the nutritional value of their products, are not
problematic because they do not suggest that the problem is one of individual
failure of fat persons. Rather, these measures offer structural solutions to promote
the health of the entire population.
In the second category, the law's failure to intervene when necessary, we
find instances in which fat persons' access to opportunities, goods, and services
provided by private actors are strongly and adversely determined by their weight;
yet the law is silent about such weight-based distinctions. Here are some
illustrations:
1) Body weight is absent from the list of suspect classes in
antidiscrimination provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause and Titles IX
and VII of the Civil Rights Act. I will focus on employment discrimination
because it is the field with the most empirical data and scholarly legal discussion.
Despite significant evidence of a connection between fatness and employment
discrimination, weight-based employment discrimination continues to be
permitted.26 There are a few recent exceptions of state and local employment
discrimination rules that enumerate weight or appearance as forbidden grounds
Sodas (Oct. 7, 2010, 7:49 AM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/07/nyregion/07stamps.html. A similar 2004 scheme by Minnesota was rejected by the
Department of Agriculture, which must authorize such limitations on food stamps, with the
reasoning that such a scheme "was based on questionable merits and would 'perpetuate the myth'
that food-stamp users made poor shopping decisions." Hartocollis, supra.
23. See infra Subsection IV.C.I.
24. See Mary Clare Jalonick, Obama Signs Historic School Lunch Nutrition Bill, SALON.COM,
Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.salon.com/food/feature/2010/12/13/us obama child-nutrition. I agree
with Professor Paul Campos' critique of this initiative as one that focuses on "getting rid of fat
kids." Paul Campos, Childhood Shmobesity, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/
article/politics/childhood-shmomesity. Campos maintains that goals such as improving the
nutritional value of school meals, helping children become more active by making urban areas
amenable to physical activity, or improving labels on food products are laudable goals, but they
should not be achieved by focusing on the slimming down of children, as this goal is neither
achievable nor relevant for improving children's health and is bound to increase the social stigma
against fat children. See id.
25. See Sewell Chan, Court Upholds the City's Rule Requiring Some Restaurants To Post
Calorie Counts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/nyregion/
18calorie.html (reporting on the rejected appeal by the New York State Restaurant Association
against a 2007 New York City initiative requiring most major fast-food and chain restaurants to
display calorie information on their menus).
26. On the empirical evidence of weight-based employment discrimination see infra
Subsection IV.C.3.a.
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for discrimination.27 But in most U.S. jurisdictions, the law does not forbid
rejecting a job candidate because of his weight. Exceptions also include
circumstances wherein the candidate has a disability discrimination claim, but
this would not be a claim of weight-based discrimination per se.28 Whether it is a
good idea to introduce weight as a suspect class in employment discrimination
law is a question I will discuss later in this Article. 29 For this early stage of the
exploration, I simply wish to note that weight is significant in access to jobs,
promotions, salaries and other employment-related resources, and that the law
does not recognize this form of discrimination as worthy of remedy.
2) Current law also does not forbid various forms of price distinction, such
as double-charging fat air travelers30 and setting a higher health insurance
premium for heavier persons, which would be considered price discrimination if
we were to conclude that these are unjust pricing practices." There are other
forms of price differentiation that might amount to discrimination. Anecdotal
examples that have made it to the mass media include charging more for a
manicure performed on a fat woman, explaining that she might cause damage to
the salon chair, 32 or charging a bereaved family extra burial services by claiming
that it would require extra effort to carry the corpse of a heavy person. Indeed, a
recent study found that fat women pay consistently more for services and
27. The State of Michigan prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of "religion,
race, color, national origin, age sex, height, weight, or marital status." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2202(1)(a) (2012). Washington, D.C. prohibits any kind of discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance ... of any individual."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2012). Interestingly, these advanced laws have produced very little
litigation, for reasons I will discuss below. See infra Subsection Ill.C.2.
28. For scholarly accounts of weight-related disability claims see infra note 244.
29. See infra Subsection IV.C.3.
30. See Brian Bolton, The Battle for the Armrest Reaches New Heights: The Air Carriers
Access Act and the issues Surrounding the Airlines' Policy of Requiring Obese Passengers To
Purchase Additional Tickets, 69 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 803, 813-16, 828-31 (2004) (examining whether
it is appropriate to interpret the Air Carriers Access Act as covering obese passengers); Scott
Mayerowitz, How Fat Is Too Fat To Fly?, ABC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
Travel/BusinessTraveler/obese-passengers-fat-fat-fly-us-airline/story?id-9227535 (reporting
American Airlines' policy for "larger passengers"); Rob Goldstone, The Tricks and Trials of
Traveling While Fat, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2010, http://travel.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/travel
24journeys.html (reporting a "plus size" passenger's unpleasant traveling experience).
31. See Theran, supra note 7, at 162-65 (reviewing evidence for discrimination in provision of
goods and services).
32. See Emily Friedman, Salon Charges Customer Extra Five Dollars Because She's Fat,
ABC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/michelle-fonville-charged-extra-georgia-
salon-shes-fat/story?id- 11461062. For other problems of accommodation of goods and services
encountered by fat clients see Kom, Too Fat, supra note 7, at 20 n.121, which cites cases dealing
with incidents such as ejecting an obese woman from a bus, or not allowing an obese woman to
bring her own chair to theater.
33. This incident was reported in the Israeli media. Amir Shuan & Shachar Genosar, Herein
Lies the Money, YEDIOT ACHARONOT, July 3, 2009, at 20.
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goods.34
3) Fashion brands such as Old Navy or H&M practice what might be dubbed
"service differentiation," by selling their large size items only online, to avoid
the damage to the fashionable image of the brand in the eyes of "regular" size
customers. Being able to buy a product only via the Internet is not a trivial
technicality, but may be considered both a symbolic and a literal exclusion of fat
consumers from the marketplace.
4) Fatness sneaks into litigation as well, often indirectly. For example, one
case revealed a prenuptial agreement in which one of the conditions of marriage
was that the wife "would not get fat." 37 Since prenuptial agreements are at the
private end of the public/private axis of contracts, I am not going to make a claim
that the law should limit contractual freedom if it interferes with the liberty-based
right to be fat. I am providing this example as an anecdotal illustration of how
cultural values about weight surface in legal documents. The spouse's weight
emerges from this agreement as such a fundamental change in the spouse that it
might be a cause of breaking the marriage bond.
Jury selection cases provide another example, whereby the "overweight" of
a potential juror is cited as a legitimate reason for a peremptory challenge. In one
case, the prosecutor explained why he struck two jurors:
[I]n his experience, this type of person had been picked on and
made fun of by others . . . [and] they might feel sorry for the
defendants because defendants also have the characteristic of
having been picked on by the police or being deprived of the
34. See generally Avi Dor et al., A Heavy Burden: The Individual Costs of Being Overweight
and Obese in the United States, GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS. 9 (Sept. 21,
2010), http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/dhp-publications/pub-uploads/
dhpPublication 35308C47-5056-9D20-3DBI57B39AC53093.pdf. Sometimes price or service
discrimination is justified on efficiency considerations, at least short-term ones. See, e.g., Ian Ayres
et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1653-56
(showing that taxi drivers might be justified in preferring white costumers because they leave better
tips, but arguing, in a vein similar to mine, that this is a circular, somewhat tragic, effect of the
market, that structural policy changes might appease).
35. Kay Jones, Old Navy Removes Plus Size Clothes from Stores, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (May
6, 2007), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/235870/old navy removesplus size line
from.html; Good News and Bad News About H&M's Plus Size Collection, JEZEBEL, Jan. 26, 2011,
http://jezebel.com/5743168/good-news--bad-news-about-spring-plus+size-fashion-from-hm.
36. See Hila Keren, Equality Within Contract Law: A Feminist Call, 31 MISHPATIM 269
(2000) (connecting the dots between exclusion of certain groups from private spaces). In the era of
late capitalism, commerce areas such as stores and malls are the current town square. They shape
people's understanding of their community and serve as arenas for political and cultural exchange.
I am grateful to my student, Guy Sadaka, for drawing my attention to this last point.
37. Dewberry v. George, 62 P.3d 525, 526 (Wash. 2003). 1 learned about this case from a
paper by Martha Ertman, Food R Us: The Primal Deal, Families, and Family Laws (June 12, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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advantages that others have. 8
The defendant challenged this reasoning, arguing that since they were both
black, this was a racially discriminatory decision. However, two courts (a district
court and a court of appeals) were satisfied with the prosecutor's explanation that
"his ten years experience showed him that he did not relate well to overweight
people, and he thought they tended to identify with defendants." 39 Besides, noted
the Court of Appeals, this prosecutor struck down three more white jurors for the
same reason. I am not interested in whether this was indeed a racially motivated
jury selection decision, but instead am concerned about both the matter-of-
factness with which certain personal characteristics are attributed to potential
jurors based on their body size and the unbearable lightness of judicial
affirmation of this "common wisdom" about fat people.
In another jury selection case, the prosecutor struck down "Juror 7920," the
only black prospective juror on the panel.40 In explaining why his decision was
not racially motivated, the prosecutor declared:
Your honor, as far as people who are overweight, women who
are overweight, I feel that people who do not take care of
themselves cause[] me a concern as far as being able to sit on a
jury, and evaluate the testimony and credibility of the witnesses.
And I exercised my peremptory against Juror 8218 [who was not
black] and the same reason for Juror 7920, as well. I think that
people who do not take care of themselves to the point of obesity
41
concern[] me, as far as being on a jury.
In finding the reasoning of the prosecutor acceptable, the trial court noted
that both jurors mentioned by the prosecutor were indeed "noticeably and
markedly overweight." 42 The California Court of Appeal found this reasoning
acceptable:
We need not evaluate the reasonableness of the prosecutor's
view of obesity to conclude as we conclude, based on the record
as a whole, that the record supports the prosecutor's explanation
that he challenged juror number 7920 because she was
overweight and not because she was African-American, that the
38. Davis v. Texas, 1992 WL 86692, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
39. Id.
40. Since the prosecutor is not a private actor but a public servant, I could have classified this
example under the first group of instances, as an illustration of State action towards citizens based
on their weight. I classify it in the second group of examples because I want to emphasize the
failure of jury selection doctrine to recognize that weight should not be a legitimate basis for
attributing personality traits.
41. People v. Wynn, 2004 WL 417221, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
42. Id. at *4.
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explanation is not inherently implausible, and that the trial court
did not err in denying Wynn's motion for a new jury venire.4 3
Given the current doctrine, it is unsurprising that the court focuses its
concern on whether the challenge to the juror was racially motivated.
Nonetheless, this decision illustrates how judicial reasoning can discursively
normalize the negative characteristics associated with fatness even when it
formally attempts to leave weight issues out of the law.
B. Three Preliminary Remarks
1. Fatness Has Become Associated with a Distinct Set of Characteristics
The prenuptial agreement case and the jury cases just discussed clearly
demonstrate how fatness is emerging in culture and in the legal discourse as an
identity with distinct personality attributes. The wife and the jurors' weight are
understood as stable signifiers of a certain set of characteristics. From the
viewpoint of the husband or the lawyer, the fat body marks not just a physical
state, but also a persona.
The abundance of expert knowledge on fatness, and the multiple regulative
schemes to monitor and correct it, render the fat body as a body that should be
thoroughly monitored, deciphered, and treated. Fatness is becoming a status. It
functions as an indicator of a set of traits that make up a certain character, or
more accurately, for a general failure of character." Fat, writes Sander Gilman,
"has taken on a new and rather sinister quality over the past century."45 The
expansive waistline, Gilman continues, has new meanings now firmly attached to
it.46 It is an index for laziness, lack of self-control, illness, contamination, and
even irrationality and feebleness of mind.47
43. Id. For a discussion of other weight-related jury selection cases see SOLOVAY, supra note
7, at 90-98. For other concerns of fat bias in criminal procedure, see Valena Beety, Criminal Justice
and Corpulence: The Unsung Role of Fatism in the Courtroom (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1667136 (discussing weight-based
discrimination of, among others, jurors and defendants); Theran, supra note 7, at 168-70 (reviewing
discrimination against the overweight injuries and in prisons).
44. I have often been asked why I do not write on ugliness in general, but instead focus on
weight. The answer is that these are different cases. Ugliness indeed prompts discrimination and
bias, see, e.g., NANCY ETCOFF, SURVIVAL OF THE PRETTIEST: THE SCIENCE OF BEAUTY (2000)
(providing empirical evidence, grounded in evolutionary biology, of the preferred treatment society
accords to beautiful people), but ugliness, unlike fat, is not subjected to the medical paradigm for
explaining it, has not become associated with a set of characteristics, and is not assumed to be in
the control of the individual (at least not to the extent that fat is).
45. GILMAN, supra note 15, at 3.
46. See id; see also Beety, supra note 43, at 12 (noting that "lawyers and jurors . .. may infer
or presume that the defendant's body provides insight into the crime and the defendant").
47. See, e.g., Le'a Kent, Fighting Abjection: Representing Fat Women, in BODIES OUT OF
BOUNDS: FATNESS AS TRANSGRESSION 130, 134 (Jana Evans Braziel & Kathleen LeBesco eds.,
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We may be witnessing what might be called "a Foucauldian turn" with
regard to fat identity. In volume I of The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault
famously observes that at a certain point in the nineteenth century, homosexual
practices ceased to be perceived merely as forbidden acts, but took on a
personality. It became an organizing category marking a fundamental quality that
lay at the core of those who practiced homosexual acts:4 8
As defined by ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a
category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more
than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century
homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a
childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life norm, and a
morphology with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a
mysterious psychology. Nothing that went into his total
composition was unaffected by his sexuality. . . . We must not
forget that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of
homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was
characterized.... [T]he homosexual was now a species.49
For Foucault, sexuality as a meaningful category in understanding the
human subject emerged as a result of a new discourse about sexuality-discourse
produced by disciplines such as medicine, law, education, and theology. It is the
very thriving of the discourse on sexuality that constituted it and regulated it as a
meaningful prism through which to "decipher" human subjects.
As with sexuality, fatness emerges as a trait that allegedly reveals much
more about the individual than medical information such as body mass index or
fats in blood. The new category of fatness pathologizes excessive weight and
paves the way for many kinds of social control mechanisms aimed to supervise
this perversion. As sociologists Abigail Saguy and Anna Ward note, "People who
cannot buy health insurance, clothing in offline stores, or are forced to buy two
airplane seats because of their body size unquestionably fall into a category that
carries social costs. Such incidents provide frequent reminders that their body
size makes them a second-class citizen."50 But these forms of direct and covert
oppression also simultaneously enable the emergence of a counter-discourse that
2001) (discussing media representations of the fat body as signifying "lack of self-control, leading
to disease"); Kom, Too Fat, supra note 7, at 222 ("Those who are obese are perceived as dishonest,
sloppy, ugly, socially unattractive, less productive, lazy, stupid, and worthless." (citation omitted));
Samantha Murray, (Un/Be)Coming Out? Rethinking Fat Politics, 15 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 153, 154
(2005) ("[J]ust some of the characteristics we have come to assume define fatness are laziness,
gluttony, poor personal hygiene, and a lack of fortitude.").
48. MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books
1990) (1976).
49. Id.
50. Abigail Saguy & Anna Ward, Coming Out as Fat: Rethinking Stigma, 74 Soc. PSYCHOL.
Q. 53, 71 (2011).
280
XII:2 (2012)
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 280 2012
17
Tirosh: The Right to Be Fat
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
THE RIGHT TO BE FAT
resists labeling large bodies as deviating and turns to paradigms such as pride and
politics of identity. In this context, it is significant to note the rise of a counter,
fat-affirming, discourse that rejects the dominant negation of fatness and aspires
to create room for an alternative discourse of a positive, visible, and vocal fat
presence.
As we have seen in the above survey of fat manifestations in law, the law
plays a significant role in creating and protecting fat as a meaningful identity
category.52 The Foucauldian framework acknowledges the interrelations between
oppressive, normalizing power on the one hand, and resistance on the other hand,
but expresses ambivalence towards this dynamic. This Article's argument, that
body size should be conceptualized as part of liberty, is offered with similar
ambivalence: wouldn't promoting recognition of body size as a new category
only serve to further reify the importance of weight? Still, I believe that
grounding the right to be fat within the conceptual framework of liberty, rather
than within the framework of antidiscrimination, would mitigate many of the
normalizing effects that are associated with the power of law. I elaborate on this
point below.sa
2. The Medical Framework's Monopoly on Legal Discourse
In the legal manifestations of fatness reviewed above, fatness is almost
exclusively discussed through the medical lens: by referring to accurate scientific
measurements, such as weight, height, and BMI, or by examining medical causes
of weight that might excuse one from responsibility for being fat. This point is
stressed here because later in this Article, alternatives to the medical approach
will be presented and advocated. 54
As early as 1977, a sex discrimination case challenged an airline for
establishing maximum weight standards for its female flight attendants that were
stricter than those for male flight attendants of the same height." Flight
attendants were subject to meticulous and elaborate supervision of their weight.
At different stages, the airlines prescribed a desired rate of weight loss (between
half a pound to two pounds per week) and issued various administrative rules,
such as requirements that a flight attendant should not be weighed during her
menstrual period.56
A federal district court accepted as legitimate the medicalized height-weight
tables in use, indicating that "the weight control program was implemented with
51. On the fat-affirming identity politics groups, see infra Subsection Ill.C.2.
52. The law does not, however, operate alone, but draws from, and feeds back into, other
disciplines of knowledge that participate in the discursive constitution of the fat persona.
53. See infra Section IV.A.
54. See infra Section IlI.C.
55. Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977).
56. Id. at 888.
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the approval of [the airline's] medical department."57 The court found that "[t]he
application of [the airline's] weight tables to the general population of the United
States between the ages of 25 and 31 would find a greater percentage of women
than percentage of men to be in noncompliance."58 Despite these findings, the
court rejected the sex discrimination claim and was satisfied by the medical
testimony submitted at trial "that weight is a characteristic which, within
reasonable limits, is controllable by an individual." 59 The court granted further
credence to the medical discourse by noting that "[t]he standards adopted for
both sexes are consistent with accepted medical notions of good health and may
be complied with without imposing a health hazard. For those flight attendants
who are medically unable to meet their chart weight, exemptions are available." 60
In another case, the court held that it passed muster to permit an employer's
physician to determine whether an employee's weight was acceptable by
consulting "a weight chart, which he had clipped out of a newspaper and which
he believed conformed to an insurance company's actuarial tables." 6 1
That this approach is not a relic of bygone judicial stances is evidenced by
recent cases that still readily adopt the medical perspective on weight. In a 2007
case that turned on the question of the evidence required to establish a disability
discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and an
analogous state law, plaintiffs weight grew beyond the limit set for employees in
his role on a team that was responsible for installation and maintenance of
telephone services. 62 The employing company hired another company to
supervise the employees' weight, and plaintiff was informed that he would have
to lose weight in order to continue his employment. The plaintiff was introduced
with a timetable under which he was required to lose fifty pounds over a period
of twenty-five weeks63 and was terminated when he failed to lose the required
weight. 4 Analyzing the problematic doctrine of ADA interpretation illustrated in
this case is beyond the scope of this Article. What I wish to emphasize here is the
face-value priority given to the medical gaze on the plaintiff's body, treating the
body mechanically, as a simple object, easily susceptible to weight reduction or
increase according to dictated and preset goals, while ignoring the plaintiffs own
account that previous repeated attempts to lose weight caused him various types
of distressing symptoms such as insomnia, a sense of sting in his hands and feet,
57. Id.
58. Id at 889.
59. Id at 890.
60. Id. at 893.
61. Or. State Corr. Inst. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 780 P.2d 743, 744 (Or. App. 1989).
62. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
63. Id at 1260.
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fainting spells, and more. 65
3. "But No One Violates the Right To Be Fat!"
One might object to the aim of this project that it makes no sense to protect a
right to be fat because no one is denying fat persons the possibility of being fat.
Indeed, in the above review of the manifestations of fat in contemporary law,
nowhere can we find a government official who chases fat people with teeth
wires (one of the more hideous and inhumane diet techniques-wiring the jaws
so that no solid food can go through the mouth),66 or threatens to throw fat people
into jail unless they lose weight. But current legal arrangements do sometimes
punish fat children and infringe the autonomy of their parents by mandating that
obese children are removed from their parents' custody to placements in which
they are closely supervised so that they will not gain weight. 67 Current law also
permits fining fat people for their weight (by allowing private actors to charge
more for goods and services sold to fat people), 8 and limiting their freedom of
opportunity (by striking fat people out of jury panels and by allowing weight-
based employment discrimination).
What the above review demonstrates is the existence of an amalgam of legal
arrangements (or lack thereof) that creates a legal climate in which being fat
means being a second-class citizen. Our law sends repeated messages that fat
people's bodies are inferior. These messages also implicate the personality to
which this body supposedly attests. They jeopardize the fat person's sense of
self-trust in his or her body and the sense of self-efficacy as an agent. Such legal
arrangements hamper fat people's ability to participate fully and equally in
various domains from the family to the market. The law has an expressive role
that is no less significant than its legal directives.69 Recognizing the expressive
role of the law enables us to realize the importance of the message sent by
contemporary law-a message that life as a fat person is less valuable in many
respects and merits less effort to create conditions for full realization of its
potential.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Pietro Castelnuovo-Tedesco et al., Jaw- Wiring for Obesity, 2 GENERAL HOSPITAL
PSYCHIATRY 156 (1980) (reporting a clinical study that found that jaw wiring was an ineffective
means for controlling weight).
67. See sources cited supra note 19.
68. See supra text accompanying note 30.
69. On the expressive role of law, see, for example, Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A
Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 81 (2007) ("By expressive law, we
mean the impact that law and legal process have on individual behavior . .. by affecting the social,
or normative, meaning of that behavior." (footnotes omitted)).
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II. THE CONTENTIOUS SCIENCE ON FAT
As with the blacks and the poor, fat people are thought to violate some of the
most fundamental tenets in American political culture: that all people are
fundamentally responsible for their own welfare; that self-control and
restraint are the hallmarks of virtue; and that all Americans are obliged to
work at improving themselves.70
[L]ives are lived in the context of a range of competing priorities, such as
cultural tradition, interpersonal relationships, physical pleasure and economic
resources. While the case for making overweight and obesity our number one
health concern may seem obvious to obesity scientists, perhaps outside in the
wider world life is seen as more complex and more prone to compromise.7'
In the discussion throughout this Article, I will assume, for the sake of
argument, and despite evidence to the contrary, that weight is mutable. That is, I
will assume that changes in lifestyle through diets and exercise, or more radical
interventions such as surgery, can lead to a long-term weight loss. I will also
assume that fatness is generally not conducive to good health, in that it is either a
factor in, or a cause of, conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, cancer, and
high blood pressure. Excess fat might decrease life expectancy and life quality.
Making these presuppositions renders the challenge of arguing for the right
to be fat more difficult. If fatness can be changed and leads to a shorter and
worse life, why should we worry about protecting a right to remain fat, instead of
encouraging fat people with both sticks and carrots to lose weight and to lead a
lifestyle that prevents weight gain? 72
Before embarking on the main argument, however, it is worth sketching the
findings and claims regarding why fat is not as mutable and unhealthy as the
medical establishment, the diet industry, and popular culture prompt us to
believe. The following discussion is not offered as an exhaustive review of the
literature, but rather as an outline of its main trajectories.
70. OLIVER, supra note 13, at 73.
71. GARD& WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 187-88.
72. The suspect categories enumerated in Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 are mostly
immutable categories, such as race, sex, or nationality. This is also true for age. See The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967). The changeable
categories, such as religion, are ones that it would seem too invasive for liberty and autonomy to
require that one changes in order to avoid discrimination. For a pioneering study showing that traits
(including weight) considered controllable by the individual are perceived as less worthy of
protection from discrimination, see Tami Kricheli-Katz, Choice Based Discrimination: Labor
Force Type Discrimination Against Gay Men, the Obese and Mothers (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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A. The Immutability of Bodily Weight
Constant advertisements for diets or fitness regimes, and the public health
discourse about the need to slim down the population, emphasize personal
accountability and self-control as the keys to "normal" weight. However, data
increasingly indicate that hormonal factors, metabolism, and genetics 73 are all
factors that predetermine one's weight and impede attempts to lose it. Long-term,
significant weight loss is still a challenging enigma to science and medicine.
Rosenbaum and his colleagues, for example, found that after weight loss, brain
regions associated with reward were more active than the parts associated with
self-control, leading to fast regain of the lost pounds.7 4 According to a 2001
survey of weight loss studies, five years after a weight loss subjects gained back
almost eighty percent of their lost weight." A 2007 extensive literature review
found even more conclusive evidence that "dieters are not able to maintain their
weight losses in the long term." 76 Studies also find that the more weight is
reduced, the smaller the chances of sustaining the new weight.77 In other words,
most weight losses (through diets, exercise, or surgery) end in regaining the
pounds lost and adding to them more weight within five years.78 Cynically
73. See, e.g., OLIVER, supra note 13, at 100-21 (surveying the research on physiological
reasons for obesity and on its immutability); Elizabeth K. Speliotes et al., Association Analysis of
249,796 Individuals Reveal 18 New Loci Associated with Body Mass Index, 42 NATURE GENETICS
937 (2010) (thirty-two distinct genetic variations have so far been identified as related to body mass
index or to obesity); Joanne E. Cecil et al., Variants of the Peroxisome Prohferator-Activated
Receptor y- and f]-Adrenergic Receptor Genes Are Associated with Measures of Compensatory
Eating Behaviors in Young Children, 86 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 167, 171-72 (2007) (finding correlation
between genetic makeup and eating behaviors of children); Anthony G. Comuzzie & David B.
Allison, The Search for Human Obesity Gene, 280 SCIENCE 1374 (1998) (indicating that by some
estimates, between forty and seventy percent of human obesity is heritable); A. Marti et al., Genes,
Lifestyles, and Obesity, 28 INT'L J. OBESITY S29, S36 (2004) (finding that it is difficult to separate
the roles of genetic makeup from that of environmental factors such as "cultural and social
mediated food intake and reduced domestic and living work activities"). But see James 0. Hill &
Edward L. Melanson, Overview of the Determinants of Overweight and Obesity: Current Evidence
and Research Issues, 31 MED. & SC. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE s515, s520 (1999) (arguing that genes
play little if any role in obesity, and that the major factor in the increased rates of obesity is the
decrease in physical activity).
74. Michael Rosenbaum et al., Leptin Reverses Weight Loss-Induced Changes in Regional
Neural Activity Responses to Visual Food Stimuli, 118 J. CLIN. INVEST. 2583, 2588 (2008).
75. James W. Anderson et al., Long-Term Weight-Loss Maintenance: A Meta-Analysis of US
Studies, 74 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 579, 582 (2001).
76. Traci Mann et al., Medicare's Search for Effective Obesity Treatment: Diets Are Not the
Answer, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 220, 230 (2007).
77. Anderson et al., supra note 75, at 583. Although subjects who exercised regularly had a
better chance of keeping their new weight, even their success was limited. See id at 582.
78. Glenn Gaesser, Is "Permanent Weight Loss" an Oxymoron? The Statistics on Weight Loss
and the National Weight Control Registry, in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note I1, at 37-40
(indicating that solid data about weight loss success is hard to find, and that the 90-95% figure of
failure in long term weight loss "may not be far from the truth"). Gaesser also points to a direct
correlation between weight loss attempts in U.S. population and weight gain of this population. Id
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phrased, the available data indicate that good strategy for gaining weight is
embarking on a weight loss program.79
Mainstream science promoting the notion that weight is mutable employs,
according to critics, problematic methodologies, such as keeping track of the
weight of research subjects for too short a time (thus boosting the data on the
success of weight loss and failing to isolate the benefits of weight loss from other
factors such as "exercise, sodium/alcohol reduction, or even antihypertensive
medication use""8 ). Critics also maintain that weight loss studies fail to address
the health consequences of weight regain, which occurs in most dieters within
five years of their weight loss.8'
Another factor that weakens the individualistic personal-choice explanations
for weight gain is the tight nexus between weight and socioeconomic factors.
Income and home location determine one's ability to access fresh produce and
fiber-rich foods. 82 Race and ethnicity are also strong predictors of weight in the
United States-partly because of their correlation with poverty 3 and the lived
environment that encourages a sedentary lifestyle, 84 but also due to genetics.
79. See LINDA BACON, HEALTH AT EVERY SIZE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT YOUR WEIGHT
47-50 (2008).
80. Mann, supra note 76, at 229.
81. Id at 230.
82. See, e.g., Paul Emsberger & Richard J Koletsky, Biomedical Rationale for a Wellness
Approach to Obesity: An Alternative to a Focus on Weight Loss, 55 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 221, 244
(1999) (analyzing the evidence that fat people are significantly more likely to be poor and
uneducated). For low-income families, it is often a rational choice to eat three meals a day in cheap
fast food restaurants rather than buy basic ingredients and prepare them at home.
83. See OLIVER, supra note 13, at 75 (surveying data that demonstrate that "America's poor
and minorities are much fatter, on average, than its middle class, whites" (citation omitted));
RHODE, supra note 7, at 42-43; Kylie Ball & David Crawford, Socioeconomic Status and Weight
Change in Adults: A Review, 60 SOC. SC. & MED. 1987, 2007 (2004) (finding an inverse
correlation between occupation status and obesity among non-blacks in developed countries); Sirin
Yaemsiri et al., Food Concern and Its Associations with Obesity and Diabetes Among Lower-
Income New Yorkers, 15 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 39 (2011) (finding a correlation between being
concerned about the availability of sufficient food to one's family and obesity rates among whites
and some sub-groups of blacks in New York). Women's body size is particularly susceptible to
poverty, probably due to gendered expectations that women prioritize the healthful nutrition of
other family members. See, e.g., Molly A. Martin & Adam M. Lippert, Feeding Her Children, But
Risking Her Health: The Intersection of Gender, Household Food Insecurity, and Obesity, 74 Soc.
SCI. & MED. 1754 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.
2011.11.013.
84. There is often a correlation between race, poverty, and environmental measures that
encourage outdoor physical activity, such as the availability of streetlights and sidewalks,
recreational facilities, and trust of neighbors. See, e.g., Charyl L. Addy et al., Association of
Perceived Social and Physical Environmental Support with Physical Activity and Walking
Behavior, 94 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 440 (2004) (finding correlation between the perceived social and
physical environment and tendency for walking and other physical activity).
85. See John P. Block et al., Fast Food, Race/Ethnicity, and Income: A Geographic Analysis,
27 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 211 (2004) (finding a higher availability of fast food restaurants in
predominantly black neighborhoods); Mason, supra note 7, at 344-45 (reviewing data on the
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The immutability of weight is relevant to the debate about weight-based
discrimination because it has implications for questions of distributive justice. It
would seem unfair, for instance, to tell a young man applying for a job that,
because he grew up in an inner-city neighborhood where the available food was
processed, rich in simple carbohydrates, and poor in fiber-facts that prompted
his high body weight-now he will not receive a fair, merit-based chance of
employment because he is too fat. Such limitations on one's opportunities due to
one's background would go against the principles of freedom of opportunity and
of meritocracy.
As these data suggest, even those who view obesity as a problem that should
be prevented (and I am not among them) should neglect the individualistic
"willpower" understanding of obesity and realize that the appropriate way to
comprehend "the obesity epidemic" is as a collective and structural
phenomenon. 86 The structure of the food market is not a natural fact, but a result
of large-scale governmental policies that would be changeable, given the right
political conviction.8 It would be both more effective and more just to redirect
government subsidies from corn and meat to fruit, vegetables, and whole grains
and legumes than to target obesity as the means to promote public health.
Similarly, attention should be directed at discouraging consumption of processed
food and fast food, which arc often cheaper than raw ingredients. This has to do
not only with price schemes, but also with other factors that determine how
Americans prepare and consume their food. The structure of the labor market,
which may require that both parents work full time in order to sustain a family,
makes it hard for parents to shop for basic ingredients and cook at home, rather
than shop for TV dinners or to dine in fast food venues.88 The ever more
unequal affliction of obesity among social groups).
86. See, e.g., Robert Paarlberg, The Politics of Obesity, in FOOD POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNow 81-94 (2010) (anchoring the causes for obesity in structural reasons such as fast
food and the food industry, and failure of governmental intervention); J. C. Peters et al., From
Instinct to Intellect: The Challenge of Maintaining Health Weight in the Modern World, 3 OBESITY
69, 72 (2002) (stressing the recognition that "obesity is not a problem of defective physiological
regulation, but is an environmental and societal problem and therefore must be approached through
environmental and social solutions").
87. For a detailed account of a different structure of food subsidies, and other original
measures such as replacing soda vending machines with carrots and grapes machines, see Mark
Bittman, Bad Food? Tax It, and Subsidize Vegetables, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/opinion/sunday/24bittman.html?pagewanted=all.
88. See Roberto De Vogli et al., "Globesization": Ecological Evidence on the Relationship
Between Fast Food Outlets and Obesity Among 26 Advanced Economies, 21 CRITICAL PUB. H. 395
(2011) (finding correlation between the prevalence of fast food change and obesity rates). In an
interview, this study's leader stressed that "the public debate is too much focused on individual
genetics and other individual factors, and overlooks the global forces in society that are shaping
behaviors worldwide." Jeannine Stein, Wealthy Nations with a Lot of Fast Food: Destined To Be
Obese?, L.A. TIMES BOOSTER SHOTS BLOG (Dec. 22, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/
201 1/dec/22/news/La-heb-obesity-fast-food-20111222 (quoting study author Roberto De Vogli).
Another study found that the prevalence of obesity was lower in areas with supermarkets and
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demanding and stressful corporate culture dictates that employees eat lunch at
their desk, and often they do not even move their bodies to go out and shop for it.
I discuss the accessibility of healthy food and of constructive eating habits
because they likely play a role in obesity rates (alongside other factors such as
genetic makeup). But I should clarify that, while I maintain that the law should
protect the right to be of any body size, this Article is not meant as a vindication
of the food industry, waiving it of its responsibility to the population's health.
This Article does not object to governmental policies that would promote
citizens' health. It does, however, strongly object to policies that target weight
and aim to enhance weight loss with sticks or carrots. As my review of the ways
in which fat manifests in law demonstrates,89 the law mostly treats fatness as an
individual fault that is in the control of each legal subject alone. All that is
allegedly needed is a stronger willpower, and the extra pounds will fall off. This
privatization of the issue is unconvincing and ineffective.
For the sake of analytical clarity, let me emphasize that, although I think that
there is much that should be done to improve access to healthier eating and more
active lifestyles, I do not believe this should undermine the right to be fat.
Policymakers should focus on measures that would improve the quality of life
rather than ones that would promote weight loss. I would argue for the right to be
of any body size, including the right to be fat, even if we were to assume a
utopian world in which everyone would have access to healthy food and active
lifestyles, and even if there were no linkage between weight and poverty or
weight and race.90 The right to be fat would still be viable under such
hypothetical conditions because, as I will show below, body size is a factor in
human experience that has intimate and diverse meanings-meanings that are far
wider than its narrow medical understanding conveys and that are derived from
one's identity, community, culture, and psychology.
B. Weight and Health
A growing body of research suggests that the correlation between fatness
and illness is much more complex than is popularly assumed and that the
prevailing argument that obesity leads to health risks stands on unstable ground.9 1
higher in areas that had fast food restaurants and small grocery stores. See Kimberly B. Morland &
Kelly R. Evenson, Obesity Prevalence and the Local Food Environment, 15 HEALTH & PLACE 491,
493 (2009).
89. See supra Section L.A.
90. Still, the grave contemporary state of eating habits and bodily practices and the increasing
weight of the population are of course a significant catalyst in writing this Article. It is likely that
had obesity not become a central issue of public policy, and had fatness not become associated with
a distinct character, see supra Subsection I.B.1, there would not have been a need for an article
about the right to be fat, for fat people would not have become a stigmatized social and legal
category.
91. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 88.
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A salient example is provided by Paul Campos' The Diet Myth,92 which
constructs a powerful critique of the economic interests of pharmaceutical
companies, physicians, and insurance companies to convince policymakers and
the public that weight is a central factor of disease. 9 3 Research demonstrates that
the weight-height charts used by health insurers and employers are skewed and
finds that some people who are considered overweight by such charts actually
live longer than those at a "normal" weight.94
There are strong indications that data on the health risks involved in weight
might be inflated and skewed.95 Research indicates, for example, that fat but
physically fit obese people are healthier than thin and sedentary persons.9 6 In
some disease, such as cancer and heart disease, higher BMI is actually associated
with lower rates of disease. 97 Furthermore, evidence suggests that the pressure by
the medical establishment to lose weight is itself a risk factor: frequent attempts
to lose weight and yo-yo dieting cause damage to physical and mental health by
increasing cardiovascular disease, mortality, and damaging self-confidence and
92. PAUL CAMPOS, THE DIET MYTH: WHY AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH WEIGHT Is HAZARDOUS
TO YOUR HEALTH (2005) (arguing that financial and political interests distort public health policy
regarding obesity); see also SOLOVAY, supra note 7, at 171-88 (discussing the interests of the diet
industry in portraying obesity a pressing medical and moral issue).
. Such interests contribute to scientific accounts that are biased and falsely amplify the
problem, enhance the sense of public moral panic, and prompt the demonization of people who are
considered overweight. When assessing the benefits of weight loss surgeries, for example, many
researchers measure and document only the success, such as the decrease in blood pressure, but not
the risks from anesthesia, infection, or other surgery side effects. Cf Jeanine C. Cogan, Re-
evaluating the Weight-Centered Approach Toward Health: The Need for a Paradigm Shift, in
INTERPRETING WEIGHT: THE SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF FATNESS AND THINNESS 229 (Jeffery Sobal &
Donna Maurer eds., 1999) (reviewing evidence on the distortion of medical research data that is
affected by what a thinness bias). Some studies also exclude participants with physical health
problems, and thus are not able to examine whether weight loss actually improves health
conditions. See Esther D. Rothblum, Contradictions and Confounds in Coverage of Obesity:
Psychology Journals, Textbooks, and the Media, 55 J. Soc. ISSUES 355, 359 (1999) (noting the
inherently problematic nature of weight-loss studies in psychology journals and how they are
misinterpreted by the media).
94. See, e.g., CAMPOS, supra note 92, at 5-40; Katherine M. Flegal et al., Aim for a Healthy
Weight: What Is the Target?, 131 J. NUTRITION 440S, 449S (2001) ("[W]eights outside the healthy
weight range may be healthy and . . . weights inside the healthy weight range may not be
healthy.").
95. See generally GARD & WRIGHT, supra note 5 (arguing that the current science on obesity is
"confused and replete with flawed and misleading assumptions" and that the inflated rhetoric of
risks associated with obesity is harmful); MICHAEL GARD, THE END OF THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC 12
(2011) (arguing that "there is now consistent evidence that obesity rates are leveling off' and
providing a helpful review of the arguments against the seeming scientific consensus on the causes,
scope, and solutions to obesity).
96. See, e.g., Xuemei Sui et al., Cardiorespiratory Fitness and Adiposity as Mortality
Predictors in Older Adults, 298 JAMA 2507, 2515 (2007) (finding that in adults sixty years old and
older, lack of fitness was a better predictor of mortality than BMI, waistline, and other measures of
obesity).
97. See OLIVER, supra note 13, at 26.
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emotional well-being. 98
Another factor undermining the conviction that weight itself is risky to one's
health is the bad healthcare provided to fat people. Physicians--operating from
the paradigm that fat is unhealthy-tend to focus on what they see as the
patient's imperative to lose weight while withholding treatment for other
symptoms and ailments. 99 Many fat patients leave the doctor's office with no
treatment for their ear infection or joint problem-but with the sole instruction to
lose weight.' u Many do not return to the clinic, deterred by the focus on their
being a failure and the lack of responsiveness to their physical distress.01 There
are also accessibility and accommodation problems: treatment beds, for example,
are often too narrow or not stable enough for very fat patients, which is another
reason that fat persons do not seek appropriate medical care. 10 2 These obstacles to
medical care frame the grim data about the bad health of fat persons in a different
light. The unaccommodating and often hostile medical institution significantly
contributes to their deteriorating health.o
There is also a problem of causality in linking weight to bad health. Science has
thus far succeeded in finding a linkage between high weight and disease, but it
98. See, e.g., Frances M. Berg, Health Risks Associated with Weight Loss and Obesity
Treatment Programs, 55 J. Soc. ISSUES 277, 279, 282-84, 287-89 (1999) (examining the unhealthy
influence of diet techniques such as pills and surgeries); Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell,
Losing Weight-An Ill-Fated New Year's Resolution, 338 N. ENGL. J. MED. 52, 52 (1998) (noting
that failed attempts to lose weight often create guilt and self-hatred, and that anti-obesity and
weight-loss drugs are linked to medical problems, such as a loss of essential nutrients). Metabolic
activity in bodies that lose and regain weight slows down, as the body reacts by slowing fat burn
due to evolutionary survival programming. See, e.g., Gretchen Voss, When You Lose Weight-And
Gain It All Back, MSNBC, June 6, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36716808/#.T52RO-
lYtYs. The sense of failure and self-unworthiness that accompanies weight regain impairs both
physical and psychological quality of life. Id. at 189-90.
99. See Kelly D. Brownell & Rebecca M. Puhl, Stigma and Discrimination in Weight
Management and Obesity, 7 PERMANENTE J. 21, 21-22 (2003) (reviewing studies that find
pervasive implicit bias against the obese even among medical professionals who specialize in
obesity treatment, and that such negative attitudes lead obese persons to avoid seeking medical
care, including routine preventative checkups such as pelvic exams or breast exams); Puhl &
Heuer, supra note 21 at 947 ("[R]ecent studies confirm that obese patients encounter prejudice,
ambivalence, and oftentimes unsatisfactory treatment in health care.").
100. Cf Marlene B. Schwartz et al., Weight Bias Among Health Professionals Specializing in
Obesity, 11 OBESITY RES. 1033, 1037-39 (2003); SOLOVAY, supra note 7, at 218-28 (discussing the
inadequate medical treatment given to obese patients).
101. For personal accounts of never returning to doctors who focus on the patient's weight
regardless of the patient's complaint see KATE HARDING & MARIANNE KIRBY, LESSONS FROM THE
FAT-O-SPHERE: QUIT DIETING AND DECLARE A TRUCE WITH YOUR BODY 49-63 (2009).
102. Cogan and Ernsberger dub this a "weight-centered approach toward health." Cogan &
Ernsberger, supra note 98, at 188; see also Susan Trossman, Obesity on the Rise Leads to
Workplace Challenges, Patient Concerns, REDORBIT (May 11, 2005), http://www.redorbit.com/
news/health/149270/obesityontherise leads to workplacechallenges patient concerns/
(noting that in American hospitals rooms are too small for obese patients, beds are too narrow,
chairs have arms, and even larger blood pressure cuffs tend not to fit).
103. See OLIVER, supra note 13, at 108 (discussing the health damages of diets).
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has yet to establish the causal direction between the two. It is unclear, for
example, whether high weight leads to high blood pressure or to diabetes, or
whether high blood pressure and diabetes prompt weight increase.10 In addition,
the monetary burden that high rates of obesity cast on the public budget is often
inflated and miscalculated, for example, by failing to include in the calculations
the millions of dollars spent on useless and even harmful diet products.' 05
Data also indicate that perhaps the growing social problem is not the
increasing rate of growth of the fat population, but instead is the increasing and
ever more radical pursuit of thinness.1 06 In our contemporary sociolegal
atmosphere, not only is there no right to be fat, but there is also a duty to be thin.
Having reviewed substantial data undermining the predominant belief that weight
is both unhealthy and mutable, I will nonetheless presume, as a preliminary
matter for the rest of my argument, that the majority is correct in its conviction
that weight is changeable and hampers good health.
C. Utilitarian Arguments
The main line of argument in this Article develops a deontological
justification for a right to be fat. Yet the predominant debate about weight
employs a utilitarian framework, emphasizing the allegedly high social cost of
fatness and the urgency in lowering this cost. Although I have deep reservations
about anchoring the right to be fat in utilitarian justifications, I provide the
following discussion to demonstrate that this right could also be instrumentally
justified. This Section challenges the prevailing view that policies that create
incentives to lose weight or to avoid gaining it promote overall utility. I will
briefly demonstrate that the current formulation of the utilitarian calculations
misses important components due to anti-fat bias. Furthermore, recognizing the
right to be fat might not be as expensive as we tend to assume, and, in fact,
acknowledging it might even produce more efficient outcomes.
104. See GARD & WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 102 (claiming that the available studies "provide
little or no information about the impact of fatness and changing levels of fat on the health of
individuals" and that there is no direct evidence tying excess fat tissue to diabetes or heart disease);
OLIVER, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that the prevailing view that losing weight is the way to
prevent diabetes, heart disease, and other conditions is based on data that prove association between
certain conditions and obesity, but not the causal direction).
105. For more problems with the calculation of the benefits and costs of obesity see infra
Section I.C.
106. One extensive study found that a high discrepancy between participants' actual and ideal
weight was a better predictor of poorer mental and physical health than actual BMI. See Peter
Muennig et al., I Think Therefore I Am: Perceived Ideal Weight as a Determinant ofHeath, 98 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 501, 504 (2008) ("[P]ercentage of desired weight loss was a much stronger
predictor of unhealthy days than was BMI."). Describing the study, the authors state, "The number
of unhealthy days increased as participants became increasingly dissatisfied with their weight. ...
[P]sychological stress associated with a negative body image explains some of the morbidity
commonly associated with being obese." Id. at 503-04.
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Cost-benefit analysis is central in prevailing discourse about obesity: The
argument is that the increase in the population's weight causes an overall
deterioration in the population's health, which in turn leads to ever-growing
medical costs, decreases in workers' productivity, etc.' 7 But such calculations of
the effect of obesity on overall welfare usually neglect the significant benefits
that fat people would draw from operating in conditions of autonomy and dignity
in whatever body size.' If welfarist approaches are to produce a convincing
argument that it is best to continue fighting obesity by targeting fat people and
creating direct and indirect incentives for them to lose weight, or refrain from
gaining it, then their calculus must take more costs into account. 109
The utility calculus must include the public money invested in convincing fat
people that their body needs to change. In addition to the burden these costs
present to the public budget, we must be aware that funds that are currently
invested in obesity-focused policies divert resources from alternative measures
that could benefit the health of the entire population, weight notwithstanding
(e.g., investing in subsidizing healthful food, decreasing pollution, designing
neighborhoods that facilitate walking rather than driving).
The health risks associated with frequent attempts to lose weight should be
taken into account. To the extent that they are effective in convincing the public
it should try to lose weight, public campaigns and other policies designed to
create incentives for weight loss damage public health. As demonstrated earlier,
long-term weight loss is virtually impossible for most, and repetitive attempts to
lose weight may be harmful for both physical and mental health. In calculating
the utility of weight-loss promoting policies, therefore, we should take into
account the damage to health by yo-yo dieting or crash diets, the complication
risks of weight-loss surgery, and the stress and decrease in self-esteem caused by
failing to lose weight and being labeled as unhealthy, not pretty, and of a weak
personality. As we know, stress is a significant health risk factor, so the mental
effects of dieting feed back to the physical ones. In other words, any argument
from utility that supports casting heavier burdens on fat people as a way to
107. See, e.g., Tomas Philipson & Richard Posner, Is the Obesity Epidemic a Public Health
Problem? A Review of Zoltan J. Acs and Alan Lyles's Obesity, Business and Public Policy, 46 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 974, 974 (2008). The authors offer utilitarian arguments such as: "The problem
is not that disadvantaged persons cannot read labels and are unaware that obesity is bad for their
health, but that uneducated persons have less of an incentive to invest in their health because their
longevity and their utility from living are below average," thus stressing that the life of the obese is
a life of lesser worth. Id. at 979.
108. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (discussing the
distinction between the intrinsic value of rights and utilitarian justifications for rights).
109. Because the utility arguments are inherently based on empirical data about obesity rates,
health costs, etc., in this Part, I abandon the assumptions employed throughout the main part of this
Article (i.e., that weight is mutable and that it is unhealthy), and return to a fact-based analysis,
which takes into account the prevalence of failure in losing weight and the indications that weight
is not as unhealthy as is commonly assumed.
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compensate for the externalities their weight casts on society (e.g., by charging a
higher health insurance premium, or by allowing weight-based employment
discrimination) must also take into account the thus-far glaringly low success
rates of such policies and assess them vis-At-vis the cost of stigma, guilt, low self-
esteem, and disempowerment that would be associated with such burdens.
The monetary costs of largely futile weight-loss attempts should not be
ignored. In addition to the health risks created by repeated efforts to lose weight,
a cost-benefit analysis of the best policy regarding weight should incorporate the
costs of the billions of dollars spent on diet products, diet food, diet groups,
etc.' 10
An assessment of the cost of fatness must additionally consider the reverse
behavioral effects offat bias. The public campaigns discussed here may not even
be efficient in changing behavior. Telling people that they should lose weight
does not prompt them to a constructive behavior associated with weight loss,
probably because such messages create psychological burden such as low self-
esteem and a sense of inadequacy. Recent studies demonstrate that the more fat
people internalize the stigma associated with their weight, and the more they are
subject to teasing about their weight, the more likely they are to binge-eat, and
the less likely they are to exercise."
Finally, law professor Gowri Ramachandran anchors body-related rights not
in dignity, autonomy, and other deontological grounds, but rather in the potential
of subversive bodily practices "to engage in making culture," to resist
conventional bodily norms, to engage in culture wars, and to "[move] culture in
radical ways" 1l2 (a function she dubs "cultural velocity"). Following this work,
utilitarian accounts of the desirability of regulating obesity should add to their
calculus the damage in halting Ramachandran's cultural velocity by
superimposing a narrow notion of the normal body size. Weight-control policies
suppress the potential for subversive and destabilizing bodily practices of fat
people (such as fully participating in activities like dancing or swimming which
110. A common figure in the literature is that the diet industry is a forty billion dollar per year
industry in the United States. See, e.g., Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Economic Causes and
Consequences of Obesity, 26 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 239, 252 (2005).
111. Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, Obesity Stigma: Important Considerations for
Public Health, 100 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1024 (2010) (finding that stigmatizing fat individuals
threatens health and interferes with effective prevention efforts); Puhl & Heuer, supra note 21, at
956 ("[T]he existing evidence is sufficient to challenge common perceptions that stigma may
motivate healthy eating behaviors, and instead suggests that bias may increase maladaptive eating
behaviors, exercise avoidance, and in some cases reduce motivation to lose weight."); see also
RHODE, supra note 4, at 42 (surveying data that demonstrates that bias against fat people is
counterproductive); Douglas Degher & Gerald Hughes, The Adoption and Management of "Fat"
Identity, in INTERPRETING WEIGHT: THE SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF FATNESS AND THINNESS, supra
note 93, at 1, 20-21.
112. See Ramachandran, supra note 12, at 30-31.
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many fat individuals prefer to avoid)" and neglect law's potential in "[carving]
out [a] space for individuals, subcultures, families, and other groups to form
different, challenging identities, and even reform them, yet still have a job,
shelter, and other needs met that would permit participation in the broader
culture."ll 4
The items on the list above are consistently omitted by the prevailing
welfarist policy discourse that advocates the pressing need to slim down the
population. It is only after incorporating these items into the utility calculus that
welfarist calls to take measures in "the war against obesity" can be made
convincingly. Including the above-mentioned components might lead to the
conclusion that the right to be fat is defensible in instrumentalist, utilitarian terms
as well.
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDING OF THE ARGUMENT FROM LIBERTY
Human beings are creatures of the flesh. What we can experience and how
we make sense of what we experience depend on the kinds of bodies we have
and on the ways we interact with the various environments we inhabit. It is
through our embodied interactions that we inhabit a world, and it is through
our bodies that we are able to understand and act within this world with
varying degrees of success."'s
Liberty is a basic tenet of modern liberal legal regimes. But liberty is an
open-ended and abstract concept, and the content that has been associated with it
throughout its existence in political and legal thought has been ever changing
depending on place, time, and context. I would like to argue here that the modern
legal understanding of liberty, as well as the related rights of autonomy and
dignity, have been based on a disembodied, mind-focused understanding of
human experience. This "trouble with the body" is to a great extent responsible
for our failure to recognize legal regulation of weight as infringing on liberty.
Our concept of liberty should be broadened to include an appreciation of body
size (along with certain other bodily traits and experiences), as an important
locus of freedom, autonomy, and dignity. This Part will lay down the
philosophical foundations for my argument that, even if weight is mutable and
113. See, e.g., Degher & Hughes, supra note 111, at 19-20.
114. See Ramachandran, supra note 12, at 31, 39 ("Due to the embodied nature of subjectivity,
control of a person's body may in fact become control of that person's very subjectivity, directing
the identity, thoughts, and beliefs of the person being controlled."). Like Ramachandran, I stress
that my argument for the right to be fat is not universal: It is contingent on the unique ways in
which fat is understood in twenty-first century U.S. society, culture, and law. In a society in which
fatness has not become associated with a set of distinct characteristics, see supra Subsection I.B.1,
there would probably be no room for this right, and it would be rendered meaningless.
115. Mark L. Johnson, Embodied Reason, in PERSPECTIVES ON EMBODIMENT: THE
INTERSECTIONS OF NATURE AND CULTURE 81, 81 (Gail Weiss & Honi Fern Haber eds., 1999)
[hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON EMBODIMENT].
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harmful to one's health, body size should be guarded from governmental
regulation and also be partly protected in the private sphere, because, like speech
or the right to have an abortion, body size is an intimate and fundamental area of
personhood. This conclusion dictates that body size must be handled with the
same respect and care apportioned for speech, even speech with which we
vehemently disagree, or for abortion, even an abortion decision that we believe to
be ill-informed and mistaken.
A. A Brief Overview of Mind-Body Dualism
Rene Descartes, arguably the founder of modern philosophy, maintained
that, in order to find certain truth, one must disregard information attained
through the senses, which sometimes mislead, and instead rely instead on the
mind. Descartes wrote, "I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or
flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things." 1 6
Descartes reached the well-known maxim cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I
am)11' and launched a bold intellectual experiment negating the importance of the
body. In Descartes' view, the body, unlike the soul, is a machine, "devoid of
subjectivity and intention."' 18 Descartes played a crucial role in our tradition,
both in conceptually separating the soul from the body and in privileging the
mind over the body by identifying it as the residence of our souls, and
consequently, our true selves. 119 This perspective has invited a view of the body
as something that could be reshaped in a limitless fashion by science, medicine,
and by the choice of the soul that occupies it.
The idea that it is possible, and even desirable, to conceptually separate
oneself from all bodily and sensory experience, has managed to keep a tight grip
on the West's imagination-so much so that it is possible to posit that in the
centuries since Descartes' dualistic framework, our ability to relate to our body
as a meaningful site of our being has been numbed. The right to be fat is a good
example. We can easily recognize the harm in limiting speech or intervening in
116. DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, in DESCARTES SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 73, 77 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1998).
117. Id. at 80.
118. Drew Leder, A Tale of Two Bodies: The Cartesian Corpse and the Lived Body, in THE
BODY IN MEDICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 17, 20 (Drew Leder ed., 1992).
119. This shift could be traced back to other origins, such as to the Judeo-Christian tradition,
which separates body and soul, or to Plato, who was infatuated with knowledge that is based on
neither the senses nor concrete material existence. In Plato's view, because the soul is eternal, it has
privileged access to the truth compared to the finite body. Since the center of my project is not
intellectual history, I focus on Descartes' ideas and their aftermath because they occupy the
scholarly critique of the denial of the body in modem sensibility. I could have delved, however,
into sources of the mind-body separation, from Plato, through Christianity, to Kant. For a
discussion of the history and philosophical origins of mind-body dualism, see Howard Robinson,
Dualism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, pt. I (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112003/entries/dualism/.
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one's religious faith, but most people simply do not appreciate what is so
shocking or wrong about sending a message to a growing segment of the
population that their bodies are deformed, inferior, and in urgent need of change.
We treat the body instrumentally, essentially as a vessel for our mind, emotions,
and other faculties that are considered abstract. But changing one's body size is
not nearly a technical thing or something that is external to the self (as Descartes
would have it). Losing weight affects the intimate corporeal experience. It affects
one's pace of walking and of breathing, the texture of one's skin, and the extent
to which the body's contours are rounded or straight angled. As the famous
Gershwin song goes, it affects "the way you wear your hat/ the way you drink
your tea." 20 It affects the most basic gestures, the most fundamental aspects of
what it means to be a person. And yet, largely due to Cartesian tradition, mind-
body dualism had a decisive influence on modern legal thought, and this
influence has had a significant role in contemporary law's obliviousness toward
the body in general, and body-size in particular, as important sites of rights.
Thinking purely, without dependence on the body, is perceived as a superior
activity. The body remains in this tradition opaque, misleading, and
insignificant.12 1 Our law, therefore, sees body size through a mechanistic lens, as
if asking legal subjects to lose weight is no more cumbersome than requiring
them to get their car fixed by a mechanic.
American constitutional law has recognized rights related to bodily
practices, such as the right to abortion, contraceptive rights, the fundamental right
to intimate consensual sexual conduct, or the right to refuse medical treatment.
These rights are distinct from the problem of bodily weight, however, in at least
two ways that contributed to their recognition as worthy of legal protection. First,
they are concerned with something the body does, or something that is done to
the body directly. The right to any body size lacks a concrete moment in which
one can take, or refrain from taking, specific actions. One's body size is
determined by myriad daily practices. This Article's argument is crucially related
to this fact: Regulating body size essentially involves regulating one's everyday
practices and habits, in a way that is disturbing when examined from the prism of
liberty interests. Second, the courts grounded the bodily rights mentioned above
in easily recognizable underlying interests that were not essentially about the
body. Abortion rights, for example, have been theorized as part of the right to
privacy. Sex rights have been explained as pertaining to the right to personal
autonomy. In the present case, by contrast, it is difficult to generalize and
120. Fred Astaire, They Can't Take That Away from Me, on SHALL WE DANCE? (RKO Radio
Pictures 1937).
121. See, e.g., BORDO, supra note 5, at 1-3 (2004) (analyzing the poem "The Heavy Bear," by
twentieth century American poet Delmore Schwartz, in which the body is represented as with me
but not "me," lacking intelligence or intentionality, clumsy, gross, disgusting and capable of
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represent through conceptual language the experience of "being of a certain body
size" 2 2 and, therefore, it is more difficult to recognize the precise interests that
are derived from one's body size. As a result, this Article suggests anchoring the
right to be fat in the right to liberty, rather than in more specific rights such as
privacy or free speech.
1. The Contemporary Critique of Mind-Body Dualism
The last four decades have seen a flourishing of scholarship that positions
the body as a central and essential site of human existence. Such critical strands
emerged from a sense of unease regarding the omission of the body in
understanding culture, psychology, history, and politics.12 3 Scholars have begun
to point out that the erasure of the body not only is unconvincing, but that it also
fails to address the role that judgments about bodies play in sustaining the
exclusion of marginalized groups such as people of color, women, Jews, the
LGBT community, or people with disabilities.124 Stigma and prejudice toward
such groups have been in large part directed at their bodily features in two
significant ways.
First, the "essence" of members of marginalized groups has been
characterized as more bodily and thus less capable of rational thinking, abstract
scientific inquiry, or artistic, ethical, and spiritual achievements.125 Women, for
example, who are distinct from men in their body and its natural procreative
functions, have been associated with an emotional and irrational nature, and thus
viewed as secondary, and even dangerous, to the development of human
civilization.12 6 Similarly, in American culture, past portrayals of black people as
122. On the ways in which the body is resistant to representation through language, see Yofi
Tirosh, Adjudicating Appearance: From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 49, 104-
08 (2007). For a discussion of conceptual language and its limitations in general, see JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 22-45 (1990).
123. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib's critique of social contract theories, which argues that
Thomas Hobbes' account that a "vision of men as mushrooms is an ultimate picture of autonomy"
erases the role of maternal pregnancy and care from our understanding of the human condition.
SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY, AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 156-58 (1992) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 109 (W. Molesworth ed., Wissenschafliche
Buchgesellschaft 1966) (1651)).
124. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 11 (1990) ("In
the last twenty years feminists, Black liberation activists, American Indians, disabled people, and
other groups oppressed by being marked as fearful bodies have asserted such images of positive
difference.")
125. See DREW LEDER, THE ABSENT BODY 4 (1990) (discussing the far reaching social effects
of the mind-body dualism, as used to sustain projects of oppression of "women, animals, nature,
and other 'Others').
126. See Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male As Nature Is to Culture?, in WOMAN, CULTURE
AND SOCIETY 67 (1974) (arguing that the identification of women with nature leads to their
devaluation across all cultures).
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sub-human were rooted in a perception that they had amplified sexual potency
and animal-like body features. These characterizations were thought to capture
fundamental bodily differences between black people and "normal" (white)
humans.'12
Second, not only were marginalized groups considered more bodily, but
their bodies were viewed as deviant, disgusting, and dangerous. Contemporary
research has documented how moral imperatives, gender conventions, and class
and race distinctions are "engraved" and "inscribed" on the body.12 8 The
emerging account of the human body suggests that these distinctions are far from
a natural, biological fact. Rather, it is constructed by socio-cultural requirements,
norms, and habits.12 9 Judith Butler famously observed, for example, that one's
sex, gender, or sexual orientation involve constant acts of reiteration, citation,
and "performative repetition" of norms associated with one's gender. 3 0 Kendall
Thomas made a similar point about race, maintaining that "'race' is a verb, that
we are 'raced' through a constellation of practices that construct and control
racial subjectivities."13 1
127. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 876-79 (2006); N.
Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1321-22 (2004); D. Marvin Jones, "We're All Stuck Herefor a While":
Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35, 71-77 (1998).
128. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE (Richard Nice trans., Harvard University Press 1984) (1979) (connecting class differences to
bodily practices such as how people eat, what they wear, and how they move about); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (discussing the evolution of punishment and how different disciplinary
practices mark the convict's body with his crime); IRIS MARION YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY
EXPERIENCE: "THROWING LIKE A GIRL" AND OTHER ESSAYS (2005) (exploring women's embodied
experiences as a way to understand the social meaning of gender).
129. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, 4 PRAXIS INT'L 402, 413 (1985) ("Identity does not
refer to my potential for choice alone, but to the actuality of my choices, namely, to how I as a
finite, concrete, embodied individual shape and fashion the circumstances of my birth and family,
linguistic, cultural, and gender identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life's story."); see
also CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 206-07 (1988) (arguing that the body is integrally
related to the self, therefore prostitution and surrogacy are unlike regular labor, where the employer
is interested not in the employee's body but in her work).
130. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY, at
xiv-xv (2d prtg. 1999) (1990). But cf Seyla Benhabib, Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy
Alliance, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 17, 21-30 (Seyla Benhabib et al.
eds., 1995) (doubting Butler's notion that there is no self behind the mask of its representation, for
it debunks women's fragile autonomy as well as any possibility for new ethics, politics, or
aesthetics); Kelly Oliver, What Is Transformative About the Performative? From Repetition to
Working-Through, in CONTINENTAL FEMINISM READER 168, 168-90 (Ann J. Cahill & Jennifer
Hansen eds., 2003) (arguing that Butler's proposal "that a theory of performative agency better
serves political theory than a theory of sovereign agency" is insufficient and needs supplementing
through critical self-analysis and interpretation).
131. Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick,
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Shifting the research focus to embodied experience, then, was an intellectual
move with potentially important implications for promoting equality and
universal humanness.132 This new attention to the body has been dubbed "the
body turn," "the embodiment turn," or "the corporeal turn."l 3 3 Scholarly attention
to the body has not stopped at research related to stigmatized groups. Today it
engages studies of "unmarked" hegemonic groups as well, a shift illustrated by
the development of fields such as masculinity studies and whiteness studies.' 34
Another vein of recent scholarship is located outside of the identity paradigm
(blackness-whiteness, masculinity-femininity, etc.) but rather explores embodied
meanings in themes and fields that vary from modern dance'13 to geography.13 6
Such accounts relate to the body not merely as a physical fact or as inanimate
matter in which the mind is clothed, but as an important site of meaning-making,
crucial for understanding human experience. They recognize the body as a site
through which the self is constituted and maintained, and through which the
powers of culture, language and society are manifested and negotiated.
2. The Body Turn in Law
The intellectual developments emanating from the critique of mind-body
79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (1993).
132. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 71-123 (2004).
133. See, e.g., Martine Abramovici, The Sensual Embodiment of Italian Women, in TOURISM
& GENDER: EMBODIMENT, SENSUALITY AND EXPERIENCE 107, 110 (Annette Pritchard et al. eds.,
2007) (discussing the "embodiment and corporeal turn in tourism studies" as an intellectual shift
that enables understanding touristic experience as sensory, and as one that goes beyond "the
passivity of the 'tourist gaze'); Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, The Corporeal Turn, 95 JEWISH
QUARTERLY REV. 447, 447-53 (2005) (discussing the corporeal turn in Judaic studies); Shoji
Nagataki & Satoru Hirose, Phenomenology and the Third Generation of Cognitive Science:
Towards a Cognitive Phenomenology of the Body, 30 HUMAN STUD. 219, 224 (2007) (referring to
"the embodiment turn" in the history of philosophy as a counter to Richard Rorty's "linguistic
turn").
134. See, e.g., CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (featuring articles such as "Growing Up (What) in America?" and "The
End of the Great White Male"); RICHARD DYER, WHITE (1997) (a cultural analysis of the
representation of whiteness in white Western literature, cinema, art, and popular culture); THE
MASCULINITY STUDIES READER (Rachel Adams & David Savran eds., 2002) (exploring themes such
as the macho, sex differences, and honor and shame); MASCULINITY STUDIES AND FEMINIST
THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS (Judith Kegan Gardiner ed., 2002) (mapping both the productive and the
tensed intersections between masculinity studies and feminist theory).
135. See, e.g., TAL KOHAVI, BETWEEN DANCE AND ANTHROPOLOGY (forthcoming 2012) (on
file with author) (arguing that the body in itself is a site of meaning production and outlining ways
to access these meanings).
136. See, e.g., Robyn Longhurst, VIEWPOINT: The Body and Geography, 2 GENDER, PLACE
AND CULTURE 97, 99 (1995) (observing that the body is portrayed in geography as the passive and
weak partner of the dominant and potent mind).
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dualism have not skipped over legal studies. 137 Legal theory dealing with
underrepresented, stigmatized, or underprivileged groups (feminist jurisprudence,
Critical Race Theory, Queer Legal Theory, and Disability Legal Studies)
explicitly sought to deconstruct the mind-body dualism and to understand the
ways in which bodily differences constitute identities and play a central role in
the legal subject's life. Moreover, physical appearance itself has been the subject
of a wide range of scholarship in the areas of discrimination' and of basic
liberties.13 9 A consistent vein in the legal scholarship on appearance is a refusal to
accept the hierarchical distinction, prevalent in Western philosophy, between
"inner" identity and "outer" appearance (or, more generally, between status and
conduct).
While studies have demonstrated convincingly that bodily practices,
including grooming and dress, do not merely represent the "real" person behind
them, but are part of bidirectional dynamics in which how one looks and is
socially perceived shapes who one is, the theoretical shift in legal thought
towards the body has yet to include body size in its account of the interplay
between body and law. In what ways does the thin or fat body constitute us as
persons and as legal subjects? What are the personal, psychological, social, and
cultural meanings of fatness, and to what extent should our legal arrangements
regarding body size be shaped by such meanings? Descartes' devaluation of the
body renders it unsurprising that we lack the vocabulary and the conceptual
toolbox to talk and think about the body as a subject of the law. This Article
establishes the theoretical foundations to begin filling this gap.
137. See generally ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997) (analyzing manifestations of the body
in different legal contexts and depicting the conceptual challenges that the body presents for legal
analysis).
138. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1279-99 (2000) (pointing to the extra "identity work" that outsiders such as women and minorities
seem pressured to do in the workplace because of negative views on their identity); Camille Gear
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 123044 (2004) (arguing that voluntary behavior, such as hairstyle, of
minority employees should be of concern to judges in discrimination cases); Patrick S. Shin, Vive
La Difference? A Critical Analysis of the Justification of Sex-Dependent Workplace Restrictions on
Dress and Grooming, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 491, 493-95 (2007) (questioning the
exclusion by employment antidiscrimination law of sex-specific workplace dress and appearance
codes).
139. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 74-176 (2007)
(arguing that the burden on minorities to assimilate through their behavior and appearance
contradicts basic liberties); Gowry Ramachandran, Freedom ofDress: State and Private Regulation
of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REv. I1, 30-60 (2006)
(proposing a legal right to dress as a liberty-based right); Tirosh, supra note 124, at 99-104, 113-19
(arguing that the identity paradigm for protecting appearance claims is insufficient, and proposing
personhood as the alternative organizing concept).
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B. Fatness as a Future-Grounded Identity
In the previous Section, I argued that the body turn in law has yet to include
body size as part of its comprehension of the interrelation between body and law.
In the following Sections, I will explore what it would mean for legal discourse
to decipher the meaning of body size. While the present Section focuses on the
negative meaning of fat and asks why, in light of this negative meaning, a
defense of a right to be fat is warranted, Section C lays the foundations for
positive accounts of fatness.
Most people perceiving themselves as fat experience the center of gravity of
their identity in their imagined, post-transformation future. 14 0 Often, they
experience the present as a limbo between a thinner past in which things were
right and a future that will restore this longed-for past. Or, if they were fat for as
long as they can remember, the leap is from a past that should be carefully
analyzed to trace the reasons that brought about their fatness, to a future of
miraculous metamorphosis into thinness. Weight loss is conceived as an act of
restoring or finally finding the true self, whose emergence will bring with it
confidence and happiness that are deficient for many fat people.141
The discourse around fat people is, then, past-centered and future-centered,
while neglecting the present. It leaps from the paradise lost onto the idealized
post-diet transformation. A full experience of oneself and one's body in the
present, with its various characteristics, both desired and unwelcome, is denied
and unattended to. Diets are often a way to suspend dealing with current issues
and challenges in a fat person's life, such as a career or relationship. As clinical
psychologist Deb Burgard told The New York Times, for many dieters "the
pursuit of thinness as a dream is a place holder. . . . It gets in the way of asking,
'What is it I am dreaming of'" Burgard further said that a dieter may think: "'If
I could just lose weight, all that will take care of itself,' so they don't invest in
getting what they want, [but instead] they invest in weight loss.",'42 Cultural
studies scholar, Samantha Murray, describes the experience of her fat body as
one in which "there is a sense of suspension, of deferral, of hiatus. One is waiting
to become 'thin', to become 'sexual', waiting to become."1 43
People undergoing weight-loss surgery often relate to the surgery day as a
"re-birth date," as an opportunity to be reborn, or as a "take two" of their life.
This narrative of dramatic transformation and of an opportunity for a fresh start is
140. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 48, at 131 (discussing fat women's experience of their bodies
"as the 'before' picture"); Samantha Murray, supra note 48, at 154-55 (noting that "the fat body is
discursively constructed as a failed body project").
141. See Karen Throsby, Happy Re-Birthday: Weight Loss Surgery and the 'New Me', 14
BODY & SOCIETY 117, 122 (2008).
142. Mandy Katz, Tossing Out the Diet and Embracing the Fat, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/health/nutrition/I6skin.html.
143. Murray, supra note 47, at 155.
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also manifested in the ritualistic practice of "before and after" photographs,
illustrating the dramatic change, sometimes to the point at which it is hard to
recognize that the two photos are of the same person.'" The structure of weight-
loss narratives, then, portrays bodily fat as an obstacle to a full and authentic
expression of one's true self, which is always thin, currently trapped within the
layers of fat that require removal.14 5
This present-denying temporal characteristic of fat identity poses difficulty
for the argument that fatness should be conceptualized as a right. If all that fat
people want is to become thin, and both fat and thin people believe that everyone
should be thin, then who needs a right to be fat?l 4 6 My answer to this question is
twofold. First, recognizing the right to be fat entails recognizing the right to be of
any body size. That is, the right to be fat does not negate or contradict people's
will not to be fat, just like the right to religious freedom entails both the right to
be free from religion and the freedom to practice any religion or none at all.
Second, in recognizing the right to be fat, it is important to be aware of the
dynamic interplay between law and life. Legal change often precipitates social
change. Therefore, protecting the right to be fat is justifiable even when fatness is
mostly experienced through its negation and temporariness. In Section III.C
below, I will describe the thriving of alternative voices in current public
discourse, involving grassroots activists, medical, legal, and policy professionals,
as well as scholars, who posit an alternative, affirmative approach to fatness.
They claim that it is both unproductive and unjust to frame the lives of so many
people as lives that would only gain value when the longed-for, permanent
weight loss finally happens.
These increasingly loud voices serve as a reminder that the commonsense
understanding of "good" or "bad" identities and bodies is constantly evolving. As
recently as four decades ago, many gay individuals would have preferred to be
able to "correct" their sexual orientation and transform "back" to straightness.
Here, "back" signifies that heterosexuality was considered the default sexual
orientation, just like "normal" BMI is considered default body size today. 14' The
notion that, for example, gay identity would be claimed and affirmed through
144. Throsby, supra note 141, at 118. Moreover, "the pre-transformation body [is conceived]
as discordant with the true self." Id. at 119.
145. The quest of the dieting person is to find "the thin person hiding inside you." Id. at 119;
see also Donald Moss, Obesity, Objectification, and Identity: The Encounter with the Body as an
Object in Obesity, in THE BODY IN MEDICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE, supra note 118, at 179, 190
(finding obese women often feel that "this body that you see is never me, I am always the beautiful
personality that resides invisibly within").
146. Cf Kevin Kolben, The Right Not To Be Fat (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (claiming that current food policy in the United States ignores the will of most Americans
to be thin).
147. Homosexuality was removed from the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders only in 1973. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY
AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 40 (1987).
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concepts such as pride seemed then not only unrealistic, but also unnecessary and
even unwelcomed. Straight was normal and good; gay was a psychiatric
pathology and a threat to the health of the individual, the family, and society as a
whole.
We might be witnessing the emergence of a similar development regarding
fat identity. It is plausible that fifty years from now, people might look back at
our time and sigh uncomfortably about how crassly wrong we were in our
expectation that fat people must correct themselves (or at least signal that they
know that they are abnormal and need to change).14 8 In advocating for the right to
be fat, then, my legal argument echoes and picks up on the radical new
interpretations of fatness by certain strands in science and culture. The
bidirectional movement between law and life suggests that recognizing the right
to be of any body size might have expressive and constitutive effects of enabling
more people to unapologetically define themselves as its bearers.
Indeed, the case of the fat body provides a powerful demonstration that
bodies "can be shown to have been lived differently historically . .. or to be lived
differently culturally." 49 Fat bodies were considered healthy and beautiful in the
Middle Ages, for example, as they signified wealth (manifested by abundant
access to food) 5 o and freedom from the need for physical labor. There are also
contemporary examples of cultures and sub-cultures that challenge the prevailing
aversion toward fat bodies. Some rappers aim to achieve a "phat" sound through
effects such as delay, echo, and double voice, but the positive characteristics of
largeness do not end with sound: they also manifest in attitude toward body size.
As Joan Gross documents, black male rappers view heavy physical weight as
symbolizing wealth, authority, and virility. 's' As another example, although male
gay culture generally demonstrates harsh attitudes toward fat, and privileges
bodies that are considered fit, there is also a cultural vein of admiring "bears":
big, hairy men, who are considered sexy and desirable.152 As much as the current
prevailing negative meanings of fatness seem to most of us so natural and self-
148. Signaling that one needs to lose weight has been theorized as an act of coming out of the
fat closet. See discussion infra Subsection Ill.C.2.
149. David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance: Foucault and Bourdieu, in PERSPECTIVES ON
EMBODIMENT, supra note 115, at 3, 8.
150. See Richard Klein, Fat Beauty, in BODIES OUT OF BOUNDS: FATNESS AS TRANSGRESSION,
supra note 44, at 19, 24.
151. See Joan Gross, Phat, in FAT: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF AN OBSESSION 63 (Don Kulick &
Anne Meneley eds., 2005).
152. See Les Wright, Introduction: Theoretical Bears, in THE BEAR BOOK: READINGS IN THE
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF A GAY MALE SUBCULTURE 1-20 (Les Wright ed., 1997). Wright's
examination of how women in Niger aspire for as much body fat as possible provides an
opportunity for re-examining Western axioms about weight. These women try to gain a lot of
weight to make themselves attractive before they marry; these women also seek to achieve stretch
marks on their stomachs, arms, and thighs. See Rebecca Popenoe, Ideal, in FAT: AN
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AN OBSESSION, supra note 151, at 9.
303
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 303 2012
40
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss2/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
evident that it is impossible to contest, I believe that such resistance is not only
theoretically possible, but also empirically around the corner. 13 On the
possibility of resisting seemingly natural and universal truths about the body, one
author writes that by exposing contrasting meanings given to the body across
time and space, "[w]e will not be able to go back to the past or to step out of our
culture entirely, but we may be able to find the resources in ourselves to save
ourselves from the destructive tendencies that the contrast reveals." 5 4
C. Phenomenological Accounts ofFatness
If, as I proposed in the last Section, the fat body is experienced through its
present negation, and is mainly located in a longed-for past and an imagined
future, then what would an alternative to this conceptual schema look like? How
would it be possible to think about the fat body in the present? The philosophical
stream of phenomenology provides appealing alternatives to the prevailing
medicalized understanding of the fat body, which sustains the dualistic
conception of the body as an object'55 and of the fat body as essentially negative
and under a pressing imperative to change. Developed by such continental
philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology
evolved, to a great extent, due to a sense of unease with the dualistic view of
mind and body.' 56 It objected to a view that treats the body as an object for
scientific accounts of human experience, which often "have objectified human
behavior, separated the senses from one another, and have failed to grasp the
subject as a holistic manner."'57 Phenomenological analysis of the body
emphasizes understanding the body not as an object, but as a "lived body," as a
meaningful site of experience, and as a body of one's own. 58
As Merleau-Ponty poignantly writes, "we are condemned to meaning."l59
153. See Klein's interesting thesis, speculating that it is either the global food crisis or simply
the pendulum movement of fashion that will bring fat back to fashion. Klein, supra note 150, at 20-
21.
154. Hoy, supra note 151, at 8. There are two more answers to the question I posited in this
Section (namely, who needs the right to be fat when fatness is a negated identity). First, even if one
thinks that fat people should aspire to lose weight, this does not mean that until they do, they should
be denied equal access to opportunities, to conditions that enable self-respect and dignity, and to
other social goods. And second (as I argued supra in Section II.C), even from a utilitarian
perspective that rejects the deontological basis for the right to be fat, there are some strong
indications to suggest that enabling fat people to lead a life in which they accept their body size
would be instrumental for enhancing the health of the overall population.
155. Mind-body dualism is discussed supra in Section III.A.
156. See id.
157. DERMUT MORAN, INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 420 (2000); see also id. at 422
(discussing Merleau-Ponty's aspiration "to rethink our traditional dualism of soul and body, mind
and body, consciousness and body").
158. See THE ABSENT BODY, supra note 125, at 5 (discussing the problematic distinction
between the physical body and the living body).
159. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, at xxii (Colin Smith trans.,
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Phenomenology rejects as unsatisfactory the traditional view of the body as a
thing, a derivative phenomenon that should be mainly scientifically examined. As
Dermut Moran noted, "The lived body is the body as immediately experienced,
that is, as an organ for action in the world, and as a vital relation to the world....
[T]he body is that through which [a person] moves through the field of daily
life." 6 o It is clear why, from this understanding, the body does not have merely a
passive role in its bearer's life, but rather an active role of constituting one's
sense of self and of shaping one's relationship to objects and to other humans.161
The phenomenological critique points to the limiting reductionism that
typifies current scientific accounts of human life. In order to count as a valid
scientific statement, data must be quantifiable, generalizable, and measurable, as
well as produced and presented from an external point of view. In contrast, the
phenomenological approach "holds that the body of a living being has an
essential structure of its own which cannot be captured by the language and
concepts used to explain inanimate nature."' 62 Living things cannot be explained
and observed only in terms of material parts and processes. Living organisms,
even when viewed through their biology, should be understood as more than
"highly complex physical mechanisms constituted only by their distinct material
parts." 6 3 This entails employing a perspective "from within," seeking the voice
of the embodied subject and his or her embodied experience.
Being attuned to the lived body involves not only noticing how we carry
ourselves in the world, but also how the world comes to be for us. In other words,
the body has a role in constituting the way we perceive and experience our
environment. The body has a significant part in creating our environment and in
the formation of meaning, relationship, and sense of self.
Importantly, phenomenology does not deny the material aspects of the body
or the ways in which it is an object or a thing. It is, however, a view that
maintains that not only is the body matter, but that the body also has subjective
aspects and that it is an intentional entity. Different body sizes would, therefore,
produce different experiences of ourselves and of the world around us. As Mark
Johnson stresses, "If our bodies were different, and if we therefore had different
bodily experiences and different kinds of interactions with our multiple and
multidimensional environments, then we would have a different sense of self and
Routlege 2002) (1945).
160. Moss, supra note 145, at 181. Moss notes that Husserl describes the body as that by
which humans hold sway in the world. Id.
161. See MORAN, supra note 157, at 426 (explaining Merleau-Ponty's understanding of bodily
inhabitance of space).
162. Leder, supra note 118, at 25.
163. Chris Oleson, Remembering the Phenomenon of Life, THE WESTCHESTER INSTITUTE,
http://www.westchesterinstitute.net/index.php?option=com_content&view-article&id-372 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2012) (reviewing HANS JONAS, THE PHENOMENON OF LIFE: TOWARDS A
PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY (2001)).
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different ways of understanding and reasoning."'
Beyond the quantitative means for understanding personal physique, health
and disease should also be understood via "qualitative differences in the
individual's relations to the physical environment, in personal temporality and
spatiality, in relationships to the family and social world, and in the struggle for
identity."1 65 According to this approach, weight gain and weight loss would be
understood as "never merely a phenomenon of the physical body. . . . They are
always also an event of the human body" 6 6 and as such are both an expression of
one's relations to the world and play a role in transforming these relations.
In the medical context, philosopher of medicine Drew Leder proposes
replacing the mechanical approach to illness with a phenomenological approach,
which considers the "lived body" as a central factor in understanding the
patient's condition. Thus, from a phenomenological perspective, one's bodily
weight would not only (and not mainly) be seen as a biological fact, measured
and explained by factors such as BMI, body fat percentage, or blood lipids.
Understanding the fat body would entail looking beyond such medical
measures.167 As Donald Moss explains, "The physician and the clinic produce a
context of vocabulary, concepts, images, and interventions which permeate the
everyday life of the obese individual."16 8 The fat body would need to be
understood in legal theory through social practices associated with it, and through
the individual's personal experience of his or her body.'69
From a phenomenological perspective, then, foundational notions such as
liberty, autonomy, freedom, experience, and agency would be impossible to
explore without tracing their bodily dimensions and manifestations.170 From this
164. Johnson, supra note 115, at 99.
165. Moss, supra note 145, at 179.
166. Id. at 181 (emphasis added) (quoting and translating MEDARD Boss, GRUNDRISS DER
MEDIZIN UND DER PSYCHOLOGIE (Switzerland, Verlag Hans Huber 1975)).
167. Leder, supra note 118, at 25.
168. Moss, supra note 147, at 182; see also id. at 188-89 (describing the "identity-depleting
battle" in an environment where "from infancy she is immersed within a total cultural milieu,
permeated by the concepts and language of a medicine which serves to define her body and its size,
in its many meanings, from her earliest self-awareness as a young woman with a body").
169. Critics point to several shortcomings of phenomenology as a comprehensive theory for
understanding the human condition in general, and embodied experience in particular. An extended
discussion of these critiques is unnecessary for the present context, both because of the very
specific application of phenomenology that this Article employs-phenomenology as an account
that can fill the gap of thinking about the fat body in the present-and because many of the
criticisms against phenomenology are, in my view, pointed at its earlier versions, while
contemporary phenomenological accounts correct for many of the shortcomings that critics noted.
Thus, for example, one criticism was that phenomenological accounts of the body tend to be a-
historical and lack social contexts about power relations. Today, however, it seems nearly
impossible to produce phenomenological work without incorporating critical lenses such as
Bourdiue's habitus and Foucault's bio power and disciplinary knowledge.
170. Legal scholars have also attempted to develop phenomenological accounts from other
perspectives, such as that of judges. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONKLIN, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
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theoretical standpoint, by which "the mind is incarnated in the body,"' 7 1 it would
simply be impossible to produce value judgments about the fat body as
disconnected from the experience of its bearer or treat the fat body as an object
that the mind can discipline or tame.
The phenomenological approach to the body demonstrates that legal
regulation of body size reaches far beyond the technical aspects of weight, such
as calories consumed and energy burned. Rather, legal policies pertaining to
body weight entail changing behaviors, emotional patterns, and personal
characteristics. Such regulation amounts to heavy-handed intrusion into intimate
areas of personal existence, which are often hard to put into words because, as
Merleau-Ponty sees it, they "arise out of a more primordial, less articulated form
of experience."l 72 In a legal system that respects personal autonomy in other
contexts, such as religious belief or freedom of conscience, such mechanistic
interruptions to the person should be considered illegitimate.
The meanings of being of a large body extend far beyond the medical
meaning of fatness. A phenomenological approach would go beyond the
"inadequacy of contemporary empiricist and scientific accounts of human
experience," which "failed to grasp the subject in a holistic manner," 73 and
would stress that "[w]hat we need to look for are not causes but reasons
motivating the behaviour of the patient." 74 For example, being heavy can
enhance one's sense of groundedness and stability in an ever-more unstable and
dynamic world. Or consider the argument that the fat body has positive sexy and
sexual qualities, as articulated by Hanne Blank: "[F]at bodies are really sexy and
sensual. There are a lot of textures and there's a lot of skin and surface area, and
a lot of sensory nerves. Everything that you've got on a thin body you've just got
more of on a fat body." 75
As another example, survivors of sexual abuse sometimes don extra pounds,
deliberately or unwittingly, in an attempt to avoid objectifying and sexualizing
gazes.176 Legal arrangements with regard to body size must recognize that the
MODERN LEGAL DISCOURSE: THE JURIDICAL PRODUCTION AND THE DISCLOSURE OF SUFFERING 135-
68 (1998) (analyzing Brown v. Board of Education from the perspective of Justice Holmes' lived
world).
171. MORAN, supra note 157, at 425.
172. Id. at 418. For a beautiful treatment of the moral recognition worthy of "unalterable"
individual qualities such as the way one laughs or moves about, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Love and
the Individual: Romantic Rightness and Platonic Aspiration, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 314 (1990).
173. MORAN, supra note 157, at 420 (citations omitted).
174. Id
175. Tracy Clark-Flory, The Joy of Fat Sex, SALON.COM, Sept. 24, 2011,
http://www.salon.com/2011/09/24/fat-sex/ (an interview with the author of HANNE BLANK, BIG BIG
LOVE (2011)).
176. See, e.g, T. B. Gustafson & D. B. Sarwer, Childhood Sexual Abuse and Obesity, 5
OBESITY REVIEWS 129, 132-33 (2004) (reviewing the available studies on the link between obesity
and childhood sexual abuse); Jennie G. Noll et al., Obesity Riskfor Female Victims of Childhood
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contours of a body are the outcome of intimate, not always explicable, pasts and
practices. Prompting people to change their body size is prompting them to
change the way it feels when they breathe, walk, and encounter others-it is
changing fundamental axes of who they are and how they experience themselves
and the world.
From a phenomenological perspective, such examples are important because
they provide an alternative story about the meaning that weight can have for
certain people; a meaning that is different from the narrow medical one that
usually monopolizes the legal discourse. Such accounts of the meaning of the fat
body bolster the position that a law's requirement that individuals lose weight or
refrain from gaining it as a precondition for equal opportunity or access to rights
and liberties is far from a mere technical requirement. This mandate requires
more than changing caloric consumption or increasing physical activity; it has to
do with deeply personal aspects of one's being.
This perspective is all but completely absent from the existing discourse on
the appropriate legal approaches to fat prevention. The law relies almost
exclusively on the medical paradigm in comprehending the fat body.177 A legal
system that fails both to appreciate the uniqueness of literally every body and to
allow its subjects the freedom to live their lives with their own, special, intimate
bodily texture (which is both a product of who they are and makes them who
they are) is a legal system that cannot claim to be based on the liberal premise of
respect for basic liberty, autonomy, and dignity.
2. The Rich Meanings ofFood and Eating
Eating habits-alongside other factors like physical activity, genetic
Sexual Abuse: A Prospective Study, 120 PEDIATRICS e61, e65-66 (2007) (finding that young adults
females who were subject to sexual abuse in childhood were more than twice as likely to be obese
compared to a demographically similar control group of nonabused women). The more severe the
sexual offense (e.g., offenses that include penetration), the more prevalent the obesity rates. See
Gustafson & Sarwer, supra, at 131 (indicating that sexual abuse that involved any type of
penetration was associated with an increased risk of obesity); see also D. F. Williamson et al., Body
Weight and Obesity in Adults and Self Reported Abuse in Childhood, 26 INT'L J. OBESITY 1075,
1079 (2002) (finding that obesity rates among adults increased the more severe and frequent the
abuse as children). Findings from these studies, however, should be read with caution, however.
Many obese people are not survivors of abuse, and fat is not protective of abuse, although it does
make reporting abuse much harder. Still, to appreciate the diverse meaning of weight for different
people, it is noteworthy that according to one study, among groups of obese people, survivors of
sexual abuse were the only ones to express positive stances towards their weight and expressed less
body dissatisfaction among obese adults. See Gustafson & Sarwer, supra, at 132-32. When asked to
indicate their ideal weight, the only ones whose ideal weight fell within the medical definitions of
obesity (rather than "normal" weight) were sexual abuse survivors. Among weight reduction
groups, victims of childhood sexual abuse lost significantly less weight and had higher likelihood
of regaining their weight within eighteen months. Id. at 133.
177. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
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makeup, and medical condition-determine body size. But eating is not like
fueling a car or charging a battery. Yet this is how they are most often discussed
by the prevailing medical discourse, which has been dominating the legal
discourse on weight. What we eat, how we shop for our food and prepare it, and
when, where, and with whom we eat are matters that have strong social,
financial, political, and emotional aspects. 178 As many scholars have argued, food
has symbolic value, functioning in our lives as a system rich with meaning.' 79 For
most Americans it would be unacceptable to measure the value of the turkey
eaten at the Thanksgiving dinner merely through the lens of its caloric and
nutritional values; turkey has a meaning special to national identity, family
tradition, childhood memories, and household rituals of preparation. (Mother's
secret stuffing recipe will never be the same if replaced by a low-calorie
substitute.) Similarly, for immigrant and indigenous communities, certain foods
and particular ways of consuming them connote the cherished past and are
significant in sustaining their affinity with their native or old homeland's culture.
Food writer Michael Pollan coined the term "nutritionism" 80 to describe the
growing tendency in America to view food and eating from the scientific lens
alone, in which food is assessed through its nutrients, such as fat percentage,
carbohydrates and protein content, and calories. Nutritionism is also how food is
treated in the legal discourse: Eat X calories to correct your body, and do not
bother us with the cultural and personal meaning of your ways of eating. To
employ a famous literary example, it is not the nutritional content of the
madeleine cookie that raised in Marcel Proust a powerful childhood memory.
Using the exact same amount of sugar, butter, or daily percentage value of
protein and carbohydrates needed for a madeleine to bake another cookie-
different in shape (a shape that, according to Proust, "look[s] as though [it] had
been molded in the fluted scallop of a pilgrim's shell,"l 82) or different in density
than the madeleine, would not have produced the same strong memory in the
adult Proust. The craving for a particular cookie as a vehicle for a faint childhood
memory cannot be summarized by the pseudomedical phrase (so commonly
178. See MICHAEL S. CAROLAN, EMBODIED FOOD PoLITIcs 130-33 (2011) (discussing a
phenomenological account of the embodied experience of food and eating, and on the changing
relations to food when one grows it in programs such as Community Supported Agriculture). See
generally SIDNEY W. MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS INTO EATING,
CULTURE, AND THE PAST 69 (1996).
179. See, e.g., Mary Douglass, Deciphering a Meal, 101 DAEDALUS 61-68 (1972); see also
Claude Ievi-Strauss, The Culinary Triangle, 22 NEw Soc'Y 937-40 (1966).
180. MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER'S MANIFESTO 28-29 (2008)
(lamenting the prevalence of the ideology for which "[floods are the sum of their nutrient parts"
rather than an approach to food that is not reliant on expert knowledge but on tradition, culture,
taste, pleasure, and identity).
181. MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST PART ONE: SWANN'S WAY 58 (Charles
Kenneth Scott Moncrieff trans., 1922).
182. Id.
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heard these days) "my blood sugar dropped, I need something sweet." The drop
in blood sugar certainly might play a part in our craving for certain foods, but it
fails to reflect the whole story. Often, the food we eat is an extension of ourselves
and our tradition, culture, community, memory, esthetic upbringing, and more.
I could go on with numerous examples of the rich meanings of particular
foods and specific ways of eating, but I presume the point is clear: our body size,
which, to a significant extent, is a product of the food we eat and of how we eat
(alongside other factors such as genetic makeup or physical activity), reflects an
array of often personal motivations that are sometimes hard to put to words.
These reasons for what we eat and how we eat are richer than a summary of
caloric consumption and energy burn measures can explain. Such reasons have to
do with who we are as humans, not merely as living organisms; they are related
to axes of our identity that involve race, religion, socioeconomic class, gender,
and more. Our body size reflects a subtle everyday internal dialogue (often in the
form of negotiation) about how we live in the world. Hence, when law or society
sends a message to people that they should lose weight, this imperative is far
from being a technical demand about reducing caloric consumption and
increasing physical activity. It is a requirement that penetrates areas of
personhood that we feel certain, in other contexts, both law and fellow humans
should stay out of. Thus, body size, like speech, thought, religion, and other areas
of liberty, should be protected from interventions by both the law and other social
actors.
3. Affirmative Accounts of the Fat Body
Since the 1960s there have been alternative voices, mainly from grassroot
activists, that have been trying to formulate and advocate for an understanding of
fat identity that is grounded in the present and rejects the focus on the fantasized
post-diet future.183 In the past decade, these voices have been growing in
prominence and visibility. Fat activism seems to draw more constituencies with
the thriving of fat affirmative blogs,'84 books, and conferences. In addition, more
scientists, dieticians, and physicians are ready to question the almost axiomatic
medical conviction that obesity is a pressing problem. These developments have
drawn the attention of humanities and social science scholars, marking the
emergence of a new field of study: Fat Studies.185 These new discourses do not
183. See generally Jeffery Sobal, The Size Acceptance Movement and the Social Construction
of Body Weight, in WEIGHTY ISSUES: FATNESS AND THINNESS AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 231 (Jeffery
Sobal & Donna Maurer eds., 1999).
184. See, e.g., BIG FAT BLOG, http://bigfatblog.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012); Marianne
Kirby, THE ROTUND, http://www.therotund.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012); Joy Nash, FAT RANT
BLOG, http://fatrantblog.wordpress.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
185. The publication of The Fat Studies Reader, supra note 9, and the forthcoming new
journal, Fat Studies, to be published by Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, are some indications of
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stop at rejecting the dominant understanding of the fat body as a signifier of
failure or disease, but instead take an extra step by developing positive accounts
that affirm the fat body as a legitimate one-a body that is an object of desire,
that can be healthy and productive, and that may rid itself of the ubiquitous and
pressing requirements to change by slimming down.
One such affirmation that has received scholarly attention is the act of
"coming out of the fat closet."'8 6 At first, the notion of a fat closet may sound
absurd, for body size is plainly visible.'87 But, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
observed, the idea of a fat closet makes sense because in contemporary culture,
occupying a fat body is difficult, because it is a discursive taboo.' 88 Until a fat
person comes out of the closet as fat (that is, until he signifies that he is fully
aware of his body size and claims a stable position within this body size), it is an
untouchable topic of conversation. Before the topic is opened to conversation,
there is little room for ambivalent or unstable meanings of the fat body. It is
deciphered by the social environment along the prevailing codes of
unhealthiness, lack of willpower, laziness, etc. As Saguy and Ward put it, "While
coming out as fat . .. does not involve revealing a secret about one's body size, it
does reveal the surprising-and potentially subversive-attitude that being fat is
acceptable."' 89 De-closeting oneself also means changing the temporal mode of
the fat body. As Saguy and Ward note, "[C]oming out as fat involves a person
who is easily recognized as fat affirming to herself and others her fatness as a
nonnegotiable aspect of self, rather than as a temporary state to be remedied
through weight loss."l90
Such a spirit of living fully with one's fat body provides the basis for a
recent public health approach called Health at Every Size (HAES).19' The
approach stems from research findings that active and well-nourished fat people
can be healthier than sedentary and poorly nourished thin people and from the
recognition that weight loss diets are generally unsuccessful and detrimental to
this new field. This development reaches law as well. At the May 2011 Law and Society
Association's Annual Meeting in San Francisco, there was a round table entitled "Legal Fat
Studies: Directions, Promises, Challenges."
186. For a study of "the migration of the coming out narrative from queer to fat politics," see
Saguy & Ward, supra note 50, at 61. See also Tirosh, supra note 5, at 274-75 (2006) (presenting
Eve Kosowsky Sedwick's idea of a fat closet and applying it to a pedagogical challenge of teaching
about weight).
187. Indeed, writes Samantha Murray, "[u]nlike the gay body, the fat body is always already
out." Murray, supra note 47, at 157.
188. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 45 (1990).
189. Saguy & Ward, supra note 50, at 66.
190. Id. at 65.
191. See generally BACON, supra note 79; Deb Burgard, What Is "Health at Every Size"?, in
THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 11, at 41 (explaining the principles of this public health
approach); ASDAH (ASSOCIATION FOR SIZE DIVERSITY AND HEALTH),
http://sizediversityandhealth.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2012) (containing information and resources
on HAES).
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health. 19 2 HEAS advocates recommend that fat people be physically active and
eat healthful food, while abandoning their attempts to lose weight.193 When Kate
Harding and Marianne Kirby, veteran bloggers on fat acceptance, recommend
adopting HAES, 194 they accompany their recommendation with several steps that
stress living in the present, rather than in an imagined thin future. They
recommend, for example, to avoid keeping clothes that do not fit as a motivator
for losing weight 9 5 and to refrain from putting things off until one is thin. 19 6
The idea is, then, that in the interests of physical and mental health for all,
our culture and law should open up the possibility for fat people to occupy the
present, to be here now. Rather than suspending their potential for a full and
prosperous life, fat people should claim the possibility to live fully in whatever
size-to be physically active, outgoing, and outreaching and to be in touch with
their present body, its needs, desires, and beauty. Such affirmative notions of the
fat body pave the road for a new way to talk about the fat body in law and for
theorizing the right to be fat.
IV. THE RIGHT TO BE FAT
[W]e should see [rights] as part of ongoing practices of social self-197interpretation and negotiation.
A. The Basic Contours of the Right To Be Fat
Thus far I have argued that human experience of body size is imbued with
meanings beyond what the medical, instrumentalist, and scientific paradigms can
capture. These meanings stem from domains as intimate and intricate as
192. For evidence on these facts, see supra Section II. B.
193. Linda Bacon et al., Size Acceptance and Intuitive Eating Improve Health for Obese,
Female Chronic Dieters, 105 J. Am. DIETETIC Ass'N 929, 935-36 (2005) (comparing women who
underwent a diet program with women who were trained in the HAES program, and finding that
the latter showed better results in health measures, physical activity, and self-esteem); Katz, supra
note 142 (quoting Steven Blair, Professor of exercise science, epidemiology and biostatistics at the
University of South Carolina, indicating that his research shows that "obese individuals who are fit
have a death rate one half that of normal-weight people who are not fit"); Marcia Wood, Health at
Every Size: New Hope for Obese Americans, 54 AGRIC. RES. 10, 11 (2006) (monitoring two groups
of obese women-one following traditional diet and exercise advice, and the other following the
HAES approach, and finding that two years later, the group of dieters regained their weight, and the
HAES group maintained a stable weight for the entire time, and that the latter group lowered their
cholesterol levels and systolic blood pressure for the entire duration of the study, as opposed to the
dieted group, who did not lower their cholesterol at all, and reduced and then regained their blood
pressure).
194. HARDING & KIRBY, supra note 101, at 13-18.
195. Id. at 158-61.
196. Id. at 213-21.
197. Leif Wenar, Rights, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (FALL 2011 EDITION),
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/fall201 1/entries/rights (last updated Jul. 2, 2011).
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emotions, culture, identity, and personhood. Such an understanding of body size
in the life of legal subjects must lead, in my view, to the realization that
contemporary law should add to the list of legally recognized fundamental rights
the right to be of any body size, including the right to be fat. This right derives
from the right to liberty and is a concrete instance of the rights to autonomy and
human dignity.198
The right to be fat is the right to be free of governmental (and sometimes
societal) intervention regarding one's weight, either by direct treatment or
indirect impact.' 99 It also means being equally entitled to social goods20 0
regardless of one's physical weight. 20 1 The legal framework of
antidiscrimination, which, thus far, has prevailed in the scholarly treatments of
the fat body in law, is important but insufficient, in my view, for fully reflecting
the role of body size in human experience. Antidiscrimination law can indeed
prevent disparate treatement of fat people on the basis of their weight, but it does
not provide ways to understand fatness affirmatively. 202 The framework of
antidiscrimination can protect a certain group from differential treatment while
still sustaining the view that the protected group is inferior, worthy of pity, and
better if changed. As the phenomenological accounts of fatness (discussed in
198. Whether the right to be fat should be conceptualized as located in the penumbra of other
constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech or as part of due process, is certainly a point
worth developing, but since this Article employs "thick brush strokes" to set the theoretical premise
for establishing the right, it seems premature to enter such detailed doctrinal analysis at this stage.
199. In Hohfeldian terms, this is a privilege-right, as it creates a duty of non-interference by
the government and by fellow citizens. However, as I show in the present discussion, the right to be
fat has other aspects of Hohfeld's typology. For example, it creates claims against those who
interfere with one's right to any body size. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 34-38 (1913).
200. John Rawls' enumeration of primary goods provides a helpful list for appreciating what I
mean by social goods. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971).
201. There is myriad literature critiquing the usefulness of rights as indeterminate,
individualistic in nature, rendering the legal discourse as monopolist and imperialist by numbing
other, non-legal venues for social change. I am aware of this literature, and still believe in the
power of using the language of rights, particularly with regards to thus-far neglected groups and
causes. For a classical formulation of the critique of rights, see, for example, Morton J. Horowitz,
Rights, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 396-406 (1988); and Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The
Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713, 719 (2011) ("[W]e need a
critical way for thinking about rights that not only survives across generations but also adapts to the
changing contours of rights."). But cf Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 301-15 (1987) (arguing that
rights are still a useful concept for those who have been denied access to them, such as people of
color); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 297, 299 (1992) (arguing that using rights to promote change
should not be construed as expressing natve faith in the power of legal change to produce a
structural revolution).
202. See generally Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle
of Constitutionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 417 (2009) (developing a holistic account of liberty,
equality, and dignity as mutually complementing fundamental rights).
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Section III.C) demonstrate, one's body size is intrinsically worthy of protection,
not just in comparison to how other bodies are treated, but due to its fundamental
role in developing and sustaining a sense of identity and personhood. According
to my suggested framework, it is the liberty to be fat that paves the way to
protecting people against weight-based discrimination. As explained in
Subsection IV.C.3 below, the antidiscrimination framework has additional
disadvantages, such as a plaintiff s need to prove that his or her body is included
in the protected group, and the reification of the medical categorization of body
size that emanates from the antidiscrimination discourse.
Injecting notions of both liberty and equality into the justifications for the
right to be fat would mean, for example, that individuals will be entitled to
medical treatment that is not only unbiased against fat people, but also abandons
the prevailing imperative to change the fat body and annihilate it to the extent
possible. Such a principle shift necessitates, therefore, going beyond the
paradigm of fairness and impartiality that underlines antidiscrimination law and a
thick account of the nature and significance of the experience of body size. Such
an account would appreciate the extent to which body size is an intimate sphere
of existence and the extent to which bodies that are considered too large can have
positive and enriching roles in the lives of their bearers. Conceptualizing body
size as an aspect of liberty would similarly entail a more careful and critical
assessment of parental capability in custody cases of fat children.
The central rationale behind the right to be fat is that sending a direct or an
indirect message to a fat person that he or she needs to lose weight in order to
gain access to various social goods, such as equal opportunity, dignity, and
autonomy, is no less intrusive than telling a legal subject how to think, what to
believe, or what to say. Limiting the extent of the body is, from the perspective of
non-dualistic notions of personhood, as severe as limiting the scope of speech.
Regulating speech and regulating body size are indeed two radically
different ways of infringing upon human freedom, but there are some aspects in
which they are very similar. Liberal legal systems recognize that speech is one of
those mysterious and idiosyncratic activities that sometimes emerge
spontaneously, without a systematic premeditation.203 Thus one need not justify
the usefulness or truthfulness of one's speech before one utters it. Additionally,
because of the law's recognition of the fragile interplay between speech and
thought, speech is left alone so as not to limit thought. Legal subjects are,
therefore, allowed to produce the most bizarre, nonsensical, and even, to some
extent, harmful speech.2 0 In the end, according to contemporary American
203. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REv. 477,
482-86 (2011) (anchoring the right to free speech in the interest of maintaining participatory
democracy).
204. The right to free speech, like any right, is not unlimited. To invoke the familiar example,
shouting "fire!" in a crowded theater would amount to an abuse of the right to free speech, and
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constitutional law, individual freedom to think and speak is, in most instances,
more important than the potential costs and damages of speech.
Similarly, as I have shown, bodily weight is related to our most intimate,
vulnerable, and inexplicable inner worlds. Even in cases when the weight-related
elements of our inner worlds can be explained, we should not be required to
account for them.205 Bodily weight has to do with the emotional value of food,
with communal and cultural aspects of eating, with one's gender,2 06 race, and
class, 207 with his or her self positioning on the spectrum of conventional beauty
and body size norms. Limiting body weight is analogous to limiting speech in
that both can be potentially intrusive. They invite society and government to
enter areas in the life of persons that no liberal political philosophy views as
legitimately accessible to others. Current legal arrangements deny a job applicant
the job because he or she is too fat, or remove children from their parents'
custody due to the children's or the parents' body sizes. For fat persons (and their
guardians) these are requirements that they change not only their BMI, but also
their psychological makeup, their idiosyncratic, fragmented, and intimate internal
dialogues, and their basic understanding of themselves, of others, and of the
human condition. Weight-related requirements, whether direct or indirect, are
requirements that one modifies core aspects of one's existence. Thus weight
should not be assessed merely through its alleged social cost, but respected as a
domain of self that is as intimate to individual privacy and autonomy as faith,
conscience, thought, or speech. Weight should be deontologically released from
the socio-legal gaze. Even readers who are convinced that being fat without
making efforts to lose weight is a bad lifestyle choice should endorse the right to
be fat. They should view it as the right to make one's own mistakes in one's own
way. This is how we think of ill-informed speech. As mistaken as it may be, it
would not be respected as part of this right. Indeed, the body also challenges the doctrine of free
speech. As Amy Adler shows, the strong judicial fears and sexual panic that females dancers can
evoke led the Supreme Court to produce a skewed doctrine of free speech. Amy Adler, Girls!
Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1108 (2005).
205. 1 developed a similar argument in a different context, in which I defended the need to rid
legal subjects of the need to explain their hairstyle or grooming practices: Tirosh, supra note 122, at
83-89, 104-08.
206. There is abundant evidence that for women, weight is often a more critical site of their
experience of self, and that women are socially sanctioned for much milder overweight than men.
See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 5, at 30-31 (women are more penalized for perceived overweight);
NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH 179-217 (Anchor Books 1992) (1991) (discussing the worrying
prevalence of anorexia nervosa among women and tying it to the increase in harsh and debilitating
cultural expectations of women at the historical moment when women entered the public and thus
far male dominated spheres); Korn, Fat, supra note 7, at 29-32 (discussing the unrealistic and
unhealthy weight expectations American women face and some of the explanations for this
phenomenon). My approach in this Article, however, is not gender-specific, for I believe that
despite the significant gender disparities in the behavior of weight vis-A-vis liberty and equality
infringements, the right to be fat would benefit both sexes.
207. On the correlation between body size and race and class, see supra Section II.A.
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should still be protected, because the damage of limiting it and interfering with it
would outweigh the benefits of such constraints.
Frances Kamm writes of the right to free speech, stating "The right to speak
freely may simply be the only appropriate way to treat people with minds of their
own and the capacity to use means to express it.. . . Not recognizing a person's
option of speaking is to fail to respect him." 208 This justification easily could be
paraphrased to fit the right to be fat: The right to be fat may simply be the only
appropriate way to treat people with bodies of their own and the capacity to use
means to embody, or occupy it. Not recognizing a person's option to live in
whatever body size is to fail to respect him. This, then, is the rationale for the
recognition of the right to be fat.
This right has both "negative" and "positive" aspects. 20 9 It is derived from
rights traditionally classified as negative, such as the right to autonomy, to
dignity, and to liberty, because it essentially requires that the government or other
societal actors refrain from intruding upon the lives of people when the basis for
such intrusion is body size. A person's body size, be it petite or voluptuous,
should be irrelevant to the relationship between the citizen and the State.
Thus, legal subjects should be free of the requirement to lose weight in order
to gain access to basic goods and opportunities, such as an equal opportunity to
serve on juries2 10 equal taxes (so that it would be illegitimate to tax only poor
people-who are generally fatter than more privileged groups-for unhealthful
foods), 2 1 1 or merit-based accreditation in public education (recall the example of
the mandatory "fat class" in Lincoln college). 2 12
Acknowledging the right to be fat does not mean ignoring the complex
208. F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 247
(2007).
209. In their important book, Holmes and Sunstein convincingly show that the classification of
rights as either negative or positive, as much as it resonates with intuition, is still false, because
negative rights also have costs and require State action to sustain them (e.g., by financing the
justice, enforcement, and correction systems, or by giving tax exemptions to organizations that
work to protect rights such as the American Civil Liberties Union). STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 37-48 (1999). While I accept
this argument, I still employ the negative/positive classification for the sake of ease of
communication about the different aspects of the right.
210. See supra Section I.A.
211. See id. As I clarify in infra Subsection IV.C.1, I am not categorically opposed to taxing
junk food. However, we should be mindful about the regressive effects of such a tax, as it would
unequally limit the consumption patterns of poor people. When taking into account that there is
significant correlation between poverty and rates of fatness, the reservations against junk food tax
become even stronger, because this might be a policy against poor people guised as neutral.
Additionally, I believe it is insufficient and unjust to tax junk food without simultaneously
increasing the affordability of healthful foods.
212. See supra Section I.A. Again, although I classify this aspect of the right as negative, we
should be mindful that these aspects of the right have costs. For example, these rights have costs in
holding effective legal proceedings that would provide remedies for infringements of this right. See
Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 209, at 35-48.
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health toll that fatness might charge.21 3 Rather, it means recognizing that some
practices merit a respectful distance despite the risks that they pose to one's
longevity, or quality of life. Indeed, going back to the canonical articulation of
liberalism, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty reminds us that this is what true respect
for personal freedom entails. Mill gives the example of a man about to cross an
unsafe bridge. It is permissible to stop him from crossing if there is no time to
inform him of the danger, and this would not count as an infringement of his
liberty, "for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to
fall into the river."2 14 Mill continues:
[W]hen there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no
one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the
motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case,
therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of
excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the
reflecting faculty), he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the
danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. 2 15
Protecting the liberty to be any body size should not be restricted to the
scope of the relationship between citizens and the government. It also reaches the
relationships among citizens, and contractual relationships in particular.216 The
right to be fat would cast a burden on private actors not to discriminate based on
213. Although these concerns may be much more limited than the prevailing account on
weight and health indicates, and many of them have been used to justify stigmatization and
discrimination. For a discussion of the contested relationship between health and weight see supra
Section II.B.
214. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 95, 100
(2002).
215. Id Mill indeed permits warning against the danger. While some may argue that because
obesity is not illegal, all that current law does is warn people against the dangers of obesity, I
contend that many of the practices currently in place do much more than inform. They are
sufficiently coercive that they are more like stopping a man than warning him.
216. Addressing the extent to which constitutional protections apply "horizontally" (between
private actors) rather than "vertically" (between the government and its citizens) is beyond the
scope of this Article. At this primary stage of conceptualizing the right to body size, I merely wish
to indicate that the right might have implication for private actors, within the constraints of
constitutional law. Indeed, the justification of the State action doctrine has been characterized as
"one of the most important and hotly debated in comparative constitutional law." Stephen
Gardbaum, The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 388 (2003).
Gardbaum argues that the threshold search for State action in order to trigger a constitutional claim
is misguided and unwarranted, because all law is subject to the Constitution. Id. at 414. For a
critique of the way that State action doctrine preserves the status quo by portraying it as neutral, see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 159-61 (1993). For a review of the ways in which
the Supreme Court already recognized private actors' duty to refrain from violating constitutional
rights, see Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality and the "Spooky" Doctrines ofAmerican Law, 59 BUFF.
L. REV. 455, 486-505 (2011). For an argument that the government has a duty to protect citizens
from fellow citizens' attempt to infringe on their right to religious freedom, see HOLMES &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 209, at 184.
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217body size (for example, in charging more for goods and services, or in using
weight as a factor in granting employment opportunitieS218).
The right to be fat also has what is traditionally thought of as "positive"
aspects. Guaranteeing the right to be fat entails that life activities and
opportunities would be open to fat persons just as they are open to any other
person. Physical spaces such as doctors' beds or theater and airplane seats would
need to be accommodating to various body sizes. 2 19 Fat people are often publicly
shamed by when the passengers next to them on the airplane demand to be seated
elsewhere, or when fat individuals are subjected to the "armrest test" to
determine whether they can remain on the flight. Furthermore, fat airline
passengers often leave a plane bruised from the seat's armrests after sitting on
two seats with an armrest in their back. Other times they are dehydrated from
avoiding beverages prior to and during traveling, because they cannot use the
220
airplane restrooms.
Like any other right, the right to be fat is not absolute and might be withheld
when it conflicts with other rights or interests.2 2 1 Recognizing body size as a
217. 1 elaborate on this point infra Subsection IV.C.2.
218. For a discussion on weight-based employment discrimination, see infra Subsection
IV.B.3.
219. The idea of setting a duty on private entities to provide physical accommodation has
already been introduced to U.S. law in Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act. I elaborate
on airplane seats infra Subsection IV.C.2.
220. Many of these forms of accommodation are similar in character and scope to the
accommodations of disabled people, and my approach draws significantly on disability legal
studies (DLS). For a pioneering account on DLS see Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and
Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of Privilege and Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy,
18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 67-79 (2006).
221. The same is true for the right to be extremely thin. This Article was written with the case
of "overweight" in mind, but the case of anorexia nervosa also raises, of course, questions
regarding the legitimate scope for legal intervention in body size, because like the fat body, the
anorexic body is considered on the extreme end of the spectrum of normative body size. As with
fatness, there are competing cultural and biological, explanatory frameworks for the phenomenon.
See ARTHUR KLEINMAN, RETHINKING PSYCHIATRY: FROM CULTURAL CATEGORY TO PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE 34-76 (1988) (mapping the culture/biology debate with regards to schizophrenia,
depression, and anxiety disorders in the context of both the mental and physical symptoms they
produce and may be caused by). But fatness and anorexia are also different in significant ways. The
threats to life and health (reproductive function, bone mass, blood makeup, immune system and
more) posed by anorexia nervosa are much less contestable and much more immediate than the
threats to life and health posed by heavy weight. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 584 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]
(discussing the menstrual abnormalities of anorectic patients); see also id. at 587-88 (indicating that
the long-term mortality rate due to anorexia of individuals admitted to university hospitals is over
ten percent); id. at 585 (noting that disorders associated with anorexia include depressive symptoms
and obsessive compulsive features). Even those considered "morbidly obese" usually live for many
more years and in much more productive and regular working and personal lives than anorexic
patients in advanced stages of the illness. This difference suggests that it might be more legitimate
to intervene in the short-term autonomy of the anorexic patient than in that of fat individuals.
Another difference concerns age. Anorexia mostly bursts among teenagers, at an age at which
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basic right would entail weighing it against other rights and interests, such as
freedom of contract, the property rights of employers or insurers, or the utility
and competitiveness of air carriers. This should be done with care similar to that
taken when balancing traditionally recognized rights, such as freedom of speech
or religious freedom, against competing state interests. I provide illustrations of
such balancing in Section IV.C below.
B. A Note About the Bearers of the Right
In presenting this Article's argument, I am sometimes asked, "But what
about those really huge people? You can't seriously include them in your defense
of the right to be fat!" Many interlocutors, who are sympathetic to the idea that
"moderately fat" people should have a weight range in which the law shall not
interfere still feel that people who are clinically defined as "morbidly obese"
present a fundamentally different challenge to law and policy.
My argument does not and cannot contain an internal distinction between
different scales of fatness. The right to be fat extends even to cases wherein most
people would agree that one's current weight is unhealthy. I do not see the
difference between saying that it might be okay to be fat as long as you are not
really fat or too fat and saying that it is okay to have freedom of speech as long
as one does not say extremely silly things or make absolutely outrageous
arguments. 22 2 Just as the real commitment to freedom of speech is tested at the
extremes, so it is with the right to be of any body size. Principled recognition of
body size autonomy means extending it to any body size.
In addition, I believe that the heaviest end of the weight spectrum is not
where the real body-size drama takes place. The endless self-critique and societal
judgment, the internal dialogues on dieting, calorie counting, and waist size also
happen in the lives of people of more moderate sizes. For many average-weight
women, for example, weighing as little as five pounds more than their desired
weight makes all the difference in the world in their feelings about themselves.
patients are neither legally autonomous nor psychologically ripe to fully appreciate the implications
of their condition. With fatness, people usually become fatter as they grow older. See LeAdelle
Phelps et al., Figure Preference, Body Dissatisfaction, and Body Distortion in Adolescence, 8 J.
ADOLESCENT RES. 297, 306-07 (1993) (finding that the highest rates of body distortion among girls
are in their mid-teenage years); DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 587 ("Anorexia Nervosa typically begins in
mid- to late adolescence (age 14-18 years).") Even when fat people were already fat in childhood,
their childhood fat normally does not kill them (at least not nearly as much as anorexia kills young
women), and so they live to be adults who can appreciate the implications of their body size more
than teenagers can. I thank Tal Kohavi for pointing out this difference.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("The First Amendment does
not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that
position."); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The asserted falseness of Nazi
dogma, and, indeed, its general repudiation, simply do not justify its suppression."); Collin, at 1210
("[I]f [First Amendment] rights are to remain vital for all, they must protect not only those society
deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects and despises.").
319
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 319 2012
56
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss2/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
These five pounds may determine whether they permit themselves to go on a job
interview, on a blind date, or to the beach. Moreover, such a gap between present
and desired weight defines whether they perceive themselves to be good, both as
women and as persons. The borders of fat identity are very fluid. For most
purposes they are not defined by medical indicators such as the lines drawn
between obese and morbidly obese BMI, but by a personal sense and social
perception of appropriateness of one's body size or the deviation therefrom.
Potential jurors or employment candidates are disqualified because they are
perceived as fat, regardless of their actual medical measurements such as BMI or
body fat percentage. For the airline hostesses who, as described in Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines,223 "were weighed once a month in full uniform including
shoes" and required to lose two pounds a week if "excess" weight was found,224
fat was a significant factor in their lives even when they would have been
considered thin by prevailing social standards.
In other words, the main locus of the right to be fat is not the "morbidly
obese." This Article is as much about those defined as slightly overweight as it is
about those at the extreme end of the weight spectrum.
C. Normative Implications: Some Hard Questions
What does a right to be fat look like? What is the meaning of this suggested
new legal notion? In this Section, I outline normative implications of this right.
1. May the Government Still Introduce Weight-Related Policies?
Releasing bodily weight from law and society's regulative grip does not
mean that the government may not introduce policies that educate and encourage
all people to live a healthier life, richer in physical activity, and with nourishing,
rather than inferior and nutritionally impoverished, foods. But in light of the right
to be fat, such policies should be introduced without using weight as a proxy for
singling out their audience. 225 Defining fat people as the target of such programs
would be counterproductive for fat people themselves, as the programs'
humiliating and stigmatizing effects would likely hamper the chances of fat
persons developing a healthy connection with their body.226 Rather, such
223. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
224. Id at 603.
225. For a helpful review of possible legal instruments for encouraging healthful habits for all,
see generally Jennifer L. Pomeranz et al., Innovative Legal Approaches to Address Obesity, 87
MILBANK Q. 185 (2009), which suggests measures such as compelling the food industry to expose
the nutritional facts of its products, introducing government speech to do the same, using tort
litigation as a regulatory mechanism, and more. See also Stephen D. Sugerman & Nirit Sandman,
Fighting Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56
DUKE L.J. 1403, 1411-29 (2007).
226. On stigma being counterproductive to weight loss, see supra note Ill.
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programs would probably lead to even greater alienation from the body and its
needs. Additionally, people who are not fat would also significantly benefit from
general health and education programs, because they have no less need for
accessible healthful food and environments that encourage physical activity.
Many people who are not considered fat by prevalent BMI guidelines or
height/weight tables still consider themselves fat or are constantly worried that
they might become fat and turn to extreme and unhealthy measures to control
their weight.227 Therefore, they would also benefit from eliminating fat-phobic
messages. An extensive study of almost a quarter million participants found that
a wide gap between one's weight and one's desired weight is a better predictor of
poor health than actual weight or BMI. 2 28 These findings demonstrate the extent
to which the public atmosphere that constantly stamps fat or seemingly fat bodies
as inferior might pose a health risk no less serious than the purported health risks
from fat itself.
The government can, for example, legitimately design a program to
encourage all citizens to walk at least ten thousand steps a day (preferably while
also creating conditions for such walks, through walking-friendly urban and
suburban planning) or to buy fresh produce at the farmers' market supplied by
sustainable farming, rather than the processed food industry. It is crucial,
however, that these programs target everyone, not only fat people.229 It could
even legitimately design a lifestyle program targeting the diabetic or high blood
pressure patients, as long as it does not use weight as a proxy for tracing the
recipients of such programs, for there are many fat people who do not suffer from
diabetes or high blood pressure and many thin people who do. In contrast, a city-
wide campaign that recruits the whole city to a goal of losing weight together to
reach a total of such and such tons within a year would be problematic, because it
focuses on weight and not on health. As a result, it would probably place social
pressure on those who visibly "spoil" the city's chances to reach its goal.230
227. The stigma associated with fatness renders those who do not presently feel fat "to live in
fear of getting fat." Marilyn Wann, supra note 11, at xi, xv (2009). A study on American teenagers
found that if they considered themselves not the right weight (too thin or too fat-regardless of
their actual BMI), they were significantly more likely to attempt suicide. Danice K. Eaton et al.,
Associations of Body Mass Index and Perceived Weight with Suicide Ideation and Suicide Attempts
Among US High School Students, 159 ARCH. PEDIATR. & ADOLESC. MED. 513, 517 (2005). Another
study found that teenagers who use conventional dieting practices, as well as teenagers who turn to
unhealthy weight control behaviors, are more likely to gain weight compared to non-dieting
teenagers within ten years. See Dianne Neumark-Szainer et al., Dieting and Unhealthy Weight
Control Behaviors During Adolescence: Associations with 10-Year Change in Body Mass Index, 50
J. ADOLEsc. HEALTH 80, 84-85 (2012).
228. See Muennig et al., supra note 106, at 504-05.
229. On the problematic ethical and factual aspects of the individualistic approach to obesity,
see OLIVER, supra note 13, at 72-76.
230. Returning to the analogy to free speech, a governmental policy that targets certain body
sizes would be subject to constitutional scrutiny similar to the scrutiny of governmental measures
limiting free speech. In Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 162-65 (1878), the Court explained that the
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2. Airplane Tickets and Health Insurance Premiums
Should air carriers be allowed to require a double ticket from very fat people
who cannot fit into one airplane seat, or at least cannot fit while leaving enough
free space for the passengers sitting next to them? And should health insurance
providers be permitted to refuse insuring very fat people, refuse to cover gastric
bypass surgery, or charge more from those whom they categorize as overweight?
How would the right to be fat help determine these questions?
First, it is problematic to determine the prices of goods and servies for
individuals, based on statistical data about their group. The practice of health
insurance companies to categorize insurance applicants based on their weight
burdens the applicants' right to be of any body size. Including fat people in a
group where certain ailments may be more prevalent is problematic because
individual applicants do not necessarily exhibit these ailments.
Second, although airlines justify charging fat people a higher price by citing
the additional costs that such passengers incur on the carrier, there are groups that
the airlines do not single out for charging higher price, even when they result in
higher costs for the airline when compared to other passengers. Religious
customers provide such an example. On flights departing from or arriving in
Israel, it is common for observant Jewish passengers to group at the rear of the
airplane during prayer times. It is often highly inconvenient for both flight crew
and other passengers wishing to use the bathroom or to have peace and quiet.
Yet, religious needs do not serve as a basis for an extra "prayer charge" in flight
tickets. Religious practices are, in our current sensibility, intimate enough to the
self to justify refraining from price distinction. I contend that bodily weight
should be too.
Both passengers in wheelchairs, who take up more space and add weight to
the airplane, and older passengers, who need to be escorted from check-in to the
gate, are not required to cover their extra costs. This might be due not only to
company image interests, but also to legal bans on disability and age
Founding Fathers adopted the First Amendment in order to prevent the U.S. government from
continuing the practice then rampant in the colonies of shaping the doctrines and precepts of the
people by taxing or punishing them for failing to comport with the predominant belief. See also
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs").
Prohibiting the government from sanctioning or even disadvantaging citizens maintaining beliefs
that society finds offensive or disagreeable is not a mere procedural technicality, but rather the
bedrock principle motivating the enactment of the First Amendment. See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The question of what
degree of scrutiny should be applied in examining the constitutionality of different policies
centered on body size is important, but it is premature in the context of this Article, whose main
goal is to provide principled preliminary justifications for the right to be fat. However, there is
undoubtedly room for future development of the intricate doctrinal framework of this right.
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discrimination.231 Indeed, it is likely that part of the reason that age and disability
are socially and legally viewed as more worthy of accommodation than body size
is because these traits are considered immutable. But another important aspect of
airlines' decision to refrain from charging the disabled or the elderly more has to
do, I believe, with dignity. Many consider it morally wrong to burden people
because of their age or physical ability, due to the paradigm of universal
egalitarian humanism. This paradigm, in turn, stresses our dignity and inherent
value as human beings. Once weight is recognized not as a moral flaw or as a
sign of weakness of character, but as a legitimate choice that belongs to one's
intimate sphere in which no one should interfere, then it would be less legitimate
to cast extra charges on fat people.
If insurers and airlines are not targeting many other groups that jeopardize
their profitability, it is not only a case of inefficient market distortion, but also a
testament to the (conscious or unconscious) fat-phobic bias that prompts such
price distinctions. Here, bias might be dressed up as inaccurate efficiency
considerations. If this is the case, then once contemporary legal systems have
recognized the importance of being left alone regarding body size-once we
recognize the right to be fat-there is room to conclude that these price
distinctions are in fact illegitimate price discrimination against a stigmatized
group. In sum, such price differentiations should be considered illegitimate
because they are based on bias rather than on straightforward efficiency
considerations, and also, because the personal characteristics that prompt this
price distinction are aspects of personhood that should be respected by society,
232including private contracting parties.
Third, fat bodies are considered a costly burden often as a result of the
absence of a more imaginative, inclusive social vision. This sentiment is an
expression of the ways in which social and physical design is based on some
problematic ideal notion of a "normal body." The theory and doctrinal directions
emanating from the field of Disability Legal Studies (DLS) have illuminating
potential for the present discussion.233 The DLS analysis reveals how public
buildings, restaurants, and workplaces are inaccessible not as a natural fact of
234life, but due to ableist assumptions about average or normal bodies. A ramp
231. The extent to which age or disability discrimination is legally forbidden in the private
goods and services sectors is a complex question, which is not the focus of the current discussion.
See supra note 218.
232. Evidence from other stigmatized groups, such as racial minorities, reinforce the concern
that insurers' decisions are not solely based on efficiency considerations. See, e.g., Ana E. Balsa &
Thomas G. McGuire, Statistical Discrimination in Health Care, 20 J. HEALTH & EcoN. 881, 901-03
(2001).
233. Some weight-based discrimination cases are litigated under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, but protection under the disability framework is off the mark for the present
discussion because fatness is not discussed here as a disability.
234. See generally Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 241, 247-48 (2003) (presenting the human rights model for
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instead of a staircase could easily render a venue accessible to more people. But
DLS delves deeper by addressing areas that require even more imagination and
accommodation effort, such as employers using text-based communication for
the hearing impaired or schools changing the pace and methods of studying and
testing to cater to those who have difficulty concentrating or reading and writing.
Realizing that there is nothing natural or immanent in the way buildings,
airplanes, or insurance policies are designed prompts new questions about the
way fat bodies are spatially and symbolically positioned as abnormal and
unfitting. Just as a ramp can unmark the person on a wheel chair, so might a
different design of the airplane rid fat people from the need to pay double for a
ticket. Also, we should be mindful that fat people who pay for two seats get more
space, but they do not receive what thin people do: a seat that fits. They get a seat
with an armrest in their back that might present a safety hazard in case of an
accident. Additionally, although they pay twice as much, they only get one set of
frequent flyers miles. What if rather than the uniform seat size in the economy
class of the plane, there would be rows with different seat sizes? Or, even better,
what if seat width was changeable by horizontally shifting the hand rests? This
would not only be an inclusive adjustment that would cater to fat people, but it
would also represent a more accurate and efficient pricing system. Today, thin or
short people enjoy extra arm and leg space without paying for it, as they free ride
on the design that assumes a normal body that is wider or taller than theirs.
Once we start looking at thin people in airplanes (thus doing away with our
treatment of their bodies as unremarkable and natural), different directions for
solutions open up. The cost of redesigning adjustable seats might be lower than
the profits stemming from the airline's ability to offer each passenger a seat fit
for their size, thereby saving the space that is currently wasted on thin and short
people.
I am not suggesting that price differentiation based on body size would never
be legitimate. I am arguing that once the right to be of any body size, including
fat, is recognized as part of personhood and as a matter that concerns autonomy,
dignity, and liberty, then price distinction schemes will need to be much more
carefully crafted than they are today. Factual assumptions about the efficiency of
a fat premium would need to be scrutinized in light of these dignity-based costs
and carefully balanced vis-d-vis the right to be of any body size. Furthermore,
pricing schemes would need to be considered in light of the effect of price
distinction on creating false notions of a normal body.235 Just as with other basic
disability); Sagit Mor, Between Hope and Evil: Reframing Disability Allowance 7-14 (2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/sagit-mor/ (challenging the
seemingly immanent relationship between disability and poverty).
235. As already mentioned, I am deliberately refraining from conducting a detailed discussion
on the exact constitutional formulation of the right. For discussions on balancing public rights
against private interests see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. L.
REV. 503, 506 (1985).
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liberties that are sometimes protected despite the cost of this protection, we
should expect that, at times, the interest of protecting the right to be fat would
236
override efficiency considerations.
Fourth, the empirical assumptions that underlie price distinctions should be
carefully scrutinized, for there are reasons to suspect that the difference in pricing
is not based on actual relevant differences of the fat body, but on perceived
differences resulting from fat bias.237 Both air carriers and health insurers base
their price distinction on the assumption that fat people would be more costly to
them than other groups, but these assumptions might be based on cognitive
biases, which do not promote market efficiency.2 38
Consider the characteristics of other customers that airlines and insurers
should target from an efficiency perspective, and yet they refrain from doing so.
Life insurance providers ask applicants about their weight in order to determine
their admissibility and their premium, but as far as I can tell, they do not ask
whether the insurance applicant has a high-stress job. Stress has been known to
have adverse effects on health and longevity that are probably no less severe than
what is often argued about weight, 239 but perhaps it is cognitively harder to
identify that esteemed and high-earning members of society are casting a burden
on the insurer's pocket. It may be also harder in terms of the insurance
company's image to charge higher premiums and attach labels to clients from a
prominent and esteemed professional segment of society. Fat people, on the other
hand, internalize their inferiority and blame themselves for their unworthy
bodies, thus making it easier for their high premium to pass muster.2 40 Fat people
236. See Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M Gross, Introduction to EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS:
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-6 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M Gross eds., 2007) (noting
that both traditional civil liberties and newer social rights often cost money); see also HOLMES &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 35-45 (claiming that all rights are positive, in the sense that they cast
a monetary burden on the government in enforcing them); id. at 20-21 ("The individual rights of
Americans . . . are generally funded by taxes, not by fees. This all-important funding formula
signals that, under American law, individual rights are public not private goods." (citations
omitted)).
237. Excellent accounts are available on biased inefficient price discrimination based on race
and ethnicity in the business sector. See, e.g., John Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in
Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 38 (1998); see also John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination
Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1387 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007) (assessing the extent to which discrimination is based on bias from an experimental
economic perspective).
238. For evidence that health costs and insurance premiums did not go up due to laws
mandating health insurers cover obese people and fund surgery, see Wang, supra note 8, at 1941-
42.
239. On stress as a health risk factor, see, for example, Anita DeLongis et al., The Impact of
Daily Stress on Health and Mood: Psychological and Social Resources as Mediators, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 486, 492-94 (1988) (finding significant relationship between daily
stress and health problems); and Stanislav V. Kasl, Stress and Health, 5 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
319, 327-35 (1984) (reviewing evidence for the correlation between stress and health risks).
240. There are myriad illustrations of such cognitive biases in business and in public mores.
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are also likely to be generally poorer than people in professional high stress
jobs, 24 1 and thus it is probably easier to give up on them as customers.
3. Employment Discrimination
Fat people are clearly subjected to adverse treatment and lack of equal
opportunity in the workplace. 242 The animosity against fat employees includes
verbal harassment243 and discrimination in hiring, wages, and promotion.24 Fat
people must often also face demeaning work practices such as periodical
weighing of employees 245 or the recent growing phenomenon of mandatory
wellness programs sponsored by the employer, which frequently involve
"aggressive" policies such as "charging higher health insurance premiums or
deductibles to those employees who do not participate in the wellness program,
or who engage in unhealthy behavior."2" Such policies send a repeated message
See, e.g., PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEM 25-26 (1983)
(discussing the double standards by which the media reports on working class accidents versus the
outcry that would occur if a similar number of corporate executives were killed at work).
241. For the correlation between weight and socioeconomic status, see supra Section II.A.
242. See, e.g., SoLovAY, supra note 7, at 99-121 (discussing the evidence and the law of
weight-based employment discrimination); Dor et al., supra note 34, at 10 (noting that female
employees who are obese earn $1,855 less annually compared to female employees who are not
obese (and 6% lower than the median women annual wage)); Kari Homer, A Growing Problem:
Why the Federal Government Needs To Shoulder the Burden in Protecting Workers from Weight
Discrimination, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 589 (2005) (reviewing and assessing the available legal paths
to claim weight-based discrimination at work, and arguing for federal legislation to protect against
such discrimination); Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, Discrimination, and Obesity, 9
OBESITY RES. 788, 789-90 (2001) (noting that the obese tend to earn lower wages for the same job
performed by non-obese counterparts and may be at a substantial disadvantage even before the
interview process begins, as they are assumed to lack self-discipline, be lazy, sloppy, and so on);
Mark Roehling, Weight-Based Discrimination in Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects,
52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 969, 971-88 (1999) (reviewing the available empirical evidence on
weight-based discrimination in the workplace); Esther D. Rothblum et al., The Relationship
Between Obesity, Employment Discrimination, and Employment-Related Victimization, 37 J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 251, 260 (1990) (noting that very obese subjects reported more types of
employment discrimination than did non-obese subjects); Theran, supra note 7, at 153-62
(reviewing evidence of weight-based discrimination in employment).
243. See, e.g., Figgins v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctr. of Mich., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d
675, 680 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (describing plaintiffs manager's questioning her on whether she made
sure she got diet soda, and documenting other similar remarks).
244. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 21, at 941-43 (reviewing recent research findings that point to
consistently prevalent weight discrimination in hiring, promotion, and wages).
245. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating that
plaintiffs, all female flight attendants working for the defendant, "attempted to lose weight by
various means, including severely restricting their caloric intake, using diuretics, and purging" in
order to comply with the defendant's weight requirements); see also RHODE, supra note 5, at 106
(describing contemporary weighing practices by employers).
246. Ann Hendrix & Josh Buck, Comment, Employer Sponsored Wellness Programs: Should
Your Employer Be the Boss of More Than Your Work?, 38 Sw. L. REv. 465, 469 (2009); see also
id. at 470 (describing an Arkansas program under which "government employees receive a heavily
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that being fat is bad and that employees must reduce their size once their body
transgresses its prescribed bounds.247 Therefore, these policies infringe the right
to body size. Under the current legal framework, some cases of weight-based
employment discrimination can be remedied under disability antidiscrimination
law-where a fat plaintiff successfully demonstrates that his weight is limiting
major life activities, or when he demonstrates that he was regarded as disabled
because of his weight.2 48 Fat plaintiffs can also argue that their employer used
weight as a proxy to discriminate on the basis of a recognized suspect category,
such as sex249 or race. 250 But framing fat discrimination as disability
discrimination or as sex or race discrimination would undermine the underlying
rationale of the present project, because, as this Article stresses, fat often serves
as an independent cause for limiting employment opportunities.25 1 Should there
reduced deductible for having a low height-to-weight ratio, measured at on-site annual physicals").
247. Indeed, in other liberty-based rights, such as the right to abortion, applying aggressive
policies against the right (such as the duty to undergo ultrasound) is not unconstitutional as long as
the fundamental right is not unduly burdened. But the right to be fat is different from the right to
abortion. Most women undergoing abortion would not view abortion as a positive or welcomed
experience in itself. Fatness, as argued above, should be conceived as an experience that can be
inherently positive, a productive locus of meaning for the individual. Thus the right to be fat is
more similar to religious freedom. Employers cannot subject employees to a religion class, nor
demand their employees to declare their religion. Similarly, employers should not be permitted to
monitor employees' weight or to encourage them to lose it.
248. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(A) (2006). For
scholarly treatments of the possibility to protect weight discrimination under the ADA and similar
discrimination acts, see KIRKLAND, supra note 5, at 126-46, which observes that identification as
disabled will result in fat accommodation, but at the same time hamper the political solidarity
needed for forging a positive group identity; and SOLOVAY, supra note 7, at 122-27. See also Korn,
Fat, supra note 7 (arguing that the ADA should protect obesity as either an actual or perceived
disability); id., Too Fat, supra note 7, at 3 ("While the [2009 Americans With Disabilities Act
Amendments Act] appears to provide more protection for most people with disabilities, this
amendment will probably not protect people who are obese absent a significant change in our
thinking about obesity."); Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 7, at 210 ("Specific features of obesity
and common reactions to the condition make it especially suited for protection under a perceived
disability theory [under the ADA].").
249. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (accepting a
claim that different weight requirements for female employees amounted to a violation of Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination). The airline cases demonstrate that sometimes the plaintiffs would
not be considered fat by conventional standards, but the employer sets a weight standard that only
fits thin employees.
250. See, e.g., Murray v. John D. Archbold Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Ga.
1999) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that employer's weight requirements amounted, among
other things, to race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, because it
disparately impacted black applicants).
251. An analogous debate on whether disability law should be the recourse exists in the
literature on transgender people. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing
Protection for Transgender People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-77
(Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that while the fear of stereotyping transgender people as
abnormal or inferior is understandable, the transgender community should not shy away from
coverage by disability laws, for the contemporary disability movement had instilled new positive
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be, then, a distinct category for weight in antidiscrimination clauses? 25 2 Should
such language enter Title VII and similar state and local employment
discrimination rules? The answer to this question is not simple, and it merits
examination in a separate article. Here I will only briefly map the key arguments
for and against such antidiscrimination legislation.
It is important to stress that unlike previous scholarly treatments of this
question, my answer is informed by my liberty-centered approach to body size,
and, therefore, contains serious reservations about including weight in the
antidiscrimination legal framework.
a. Arguments in Support of Banning Weight-Based Employment
Discrimination
First, as already mentioned, there is consistent empirical evidence suggesting
that fat people pay in opportunities and income because of their weight. Fat
people are often judged not on their merits (i.e. their education, skills, or
experience) but on the assumed meanings of their size. This is not only unjust,
but also inefficient for employers, because by focusing on weight they might
miss qualified employees. 25 3 Fat people are also frequently subjected to hostile
environments where co-workers and managers peck at them for eating certain
foods or make humiliating remarks.2 54
Second, it is legitimate to interfere with the contractual freedom of
employers in this context even if we stick with one of this Article's preliminary
assumptions-that weight is a mutable characteristic within the person's control.
Antidiscrimination clauses contain not only immutable traits (such as race, sex,
age, or nationality), but also traits that are within the control of the individual,
such as religion or marital and parental status. The rationale for marking the latter
characteristics as suspect categories is that they concern matters so central to the
core of personhood that people should not be required to change them in order to
gain access to equal employment opportunities. According to the theoretical
and critical meanings to disability).
252. A small number of states and municipalities did introduce "weight," "appearance," and
similar phrases as forbidden grounds in their employment discrimination law. See, e.g., District of
Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (2002); Elliott-Larcen Civil Rights
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2101-2804 (1976) (a Michigan law prohibiting an employer from
discriminating on the basis of, inter alia, weight). Litigation is, however, still too scant to allow for
assessing the effects of such laws.
253. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 7 (providing ample evidence for appearance-based
employment discrimination and suggesting legal reform to prevent such discrimination). But cf
William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our
Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & Po'Y 153, 178 (2007) (arguing that the
logic of U.S. antidiscrimination law does not extend to banning appearance-based discrimination).
254. See, e.g., Leanne Joanisse & Anthony Synnott, Fighting Back: Reactions and Resistance
to the Stigma of Obesity, in WEIGHTY ISSUES: FATNESS AND THINNESS AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 185, at 49, 56.
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framework developed in this Article, weight is a core part of personhood and,
therefore, should be free of societal intervention. As such, it is similar to religious
freedom or family status, with which, in general, employers cannot interfere.
Questions of merit-based hiring and promotion are always complicated, and
the area of body size is no exception. In what jobs would employers be permitted
to consider damage to company image caused by a service giver who is
"unaesthetic," for example? Should they be allowed to consider the health
insurance costs of fat employees? These questions should be determined by
drawing from analogies found in the existing tools of employment discrimination
doctrine.255 What is clear, however, is that many assumptions about skills,
professionalism, and performance of fat people are shaped by bias rather than
evidence. Indeed, in certain occupations, there might be bona fide occupational
qualifications to justify excluding many fat candidates, but the criterion used for
assessment should not be the candidate's weight per se, but the candidate's
abilities. For example, police officers should be agile and able to operate quickly.
While many fat people might not meet this job requirement, some fat people
might be fit enough to qualify, and many thin people would not qualify as well.
Additionally, since the right to be fat also has positive aspects, recognizing it
would create duties for employers to create reasonable accommodations, similar
to their duties under disability law.256 For example, employers would have the
duty to provide office furniture that would fit their employees' sizes, or a big
enough sitting space in the bus or truck that they would drive.
b. Arguments Against a Legal Ban on Weight-Based Employment
Discrimination
First, the most disconcerting potential consequence of introducing weight to
the list of suspect categories in employment antidiscrimination laws is that such
laws would pave the way for a whole new spectrum of oppressive legal discourse
about the fat body. Despite good intentions to protect fat people from
discrimination, the legal gaze at fat plaintiffs' bodies might produce more
humiliating outcomes than the harm of discrimination itself. The concern here is
that the legal discourse on weight would normalize the medical framework for
255. For example, courts have been very careful not to construe customer preferences as Bona
Fide Occupational Qualifications, and this principle should apply to the case of body size as well.
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 147, 196-201 (2004) (analyzing the cases in which courts do
permit recognizing customer preferences as BFOQ). For an excellent account of the extent to
which antidiscrimination law can remedy weight-based discrimination, see generally KIRKLAND,
supra note 6.
256. See generally Jeffry 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1991) (discussing the scope of the employer's duty to provide
accommodation under the ADA).
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talking about the fat body. The law would thereby partake in disciplining it,
rather than assisting in its liberation. This, in my view, is a central weakness of
antidiscrimination discourse: While it focuses on equalizing the treatment of the
protected group to that of others, there are no internal mechanisms within this
discourse to guarantee that the protected group will not still be portrayed by this
discourse as inferior and pitiful, albeit worthy of tolerance. This is why, as I
argue here, a liberty-based protection of body size should underlie any weight-
based antidiscrimination rule.25 7
In reading existing weight discrimination cases, we can witness the
emergence of discursive conventions, or trends in speech, that tell the story of the
fat body in a vocabulary that is governed by the medical understanding of the fat
body, finding no trace of, and leaving no room for, competing meanings of
corpulence. Figures, measurements, body organs and physical functions such as
glandular activity, genetic makeup, and various metabolites are all meant to
establish a seemingly objective viewpoint on which the legal gaze can
comfortably rely in assessing the legitimacy of the fat body. To illustrate,
consider this statement, from a case arguing, among other things, weight-based
discrimination: "[A]t the time her employment was terminated, she was fifty-five
years old, 5'7" tall and weighed about 240 pounds and . . . previously, she had
weighed as much as 311 pounds." 25 8
As another example, we read that the plaintiff did not present evidence to
show that his weight was a result of a genetic or metabolic condition.259
Sometimes, such medicalized measurements of bodies in the workplace do not
stop at describing the plaintiffs body, but spread to descriptions of the bodies of
colleagues and supervisors. 260 As should be clear by now, I find this way of
talking and writing about the fat body to be reductive as it provides a partial and
non-humanist account of the body as a machine devoid of complex meanings and
multiple motivations. 26 1
257. For a discussion of the impact of disability movements on identity politics, see generally
Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 647 (1996).
258. Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 584 N.W.2d 589, 589 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998). Other examples abound. See, e.g., Phil. Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 448 A.2d 701, 214 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) ("On the date in question, [Petitioner] was 27 years old, 5' 8" tall and weighed
341 pounds. There is no question that on April 26, 1977 [Petitioner) was morbidly obese."). On the
normalization of the discourse on fat, see KIRKLAND, supra note 7, at 112-14. See also id at 112
("[M]ore and more concerns about fat are expressed with demographics, Body Mass Index (BMI)
ranges, and cost projections.").
259. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. N.Y. State Div. Human Rights, 689 N.E.2d 898, 91 N.Y.2d
65, 73 (1997) ("Appellants did not proffer evidence or make a record establishing that they are
medically incapable of meeting Delta's weight requirements due to some cognizable medical
condition.").
260. See, e.g., Figgins v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mich., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d
675, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (describing the weights of the plaintiffs area manager, regional
director of operations, and assistant manager).
261. These concerns are raised by the critical disability literature as well, which stresses the
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Indeed, similar problems, concerning the normalizing effects of the legal
discourse, have been addressed by scholars with regard to subjecting sex, race, or
sexuality to the gaze of antidiscrimination law. I suspect, however, that the
damage in the case of weight might be even more severe, since being a woman or
a person of color are statuses that do not require as intrusive and clinical of an
inquiry into whether or not they fall into the protected category as weight does,
and do not burden the plaintiffs with a detailed depiction of their "condition." 2 62
The antidiscrimination framework entails that a plaintiff classify his or her
specific body size according to a ready-made legal categorization of bodies. This
is bound to come with the price of reifying the medical taxonomy of body size,
thereby stifling competing perspectives on body size and its role in human
experience.
If protecting fat people from discrimination would require subjecting
plaintiffs to a legal inquiry about their weight, metabolic function, genetic
makeup and lifestyle, then perhaps antidiscrimination law is not the appropriate
means for protecting fat people against discrimination. An alternative dignity- or
liberty-based legal framework for providing remedies for workplace
infringements might be better suited in this context, in that it might rid litigation
of the need to require plaintiffs to define their identity and fit it into the protected
category.263 Liberty or dignity claims do not require that the plaintiff prove that
he or she belongs to a certain protected group. Rather, they are based on a
conception of universal humanness, thus avoiding the need to meticulously
examine the weight of the plaintiff or the reasons that brought about his or her
body size. It is precisely because weight is extremely meaningful to
individuals-imbued with meanings that often resist representation in language
need to differentiate between impairment (referring to the physical limitation) and disability
(referring to the social exclusion, which is not a necessary outcome of impairment, but a result of
social organization that takes little or no account of people who have physical impairment and,
thus, exludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities). See UNION OF THE
PHYSICALLY IMPAIRED AGAINST SEGREGATION, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF DISABILITY 20
(1975). However, I think the question of body size presents an even bigger challenge to the
dilemma of whether to surrender the body to representation in language, because there is something
about the status of weight in our culture that is so loaded with shame and negative judgment that it
is virtually impossible to surrender it to language without oppressive and normalizing outcomes. I
explored this question in Tirosh, supra note 5. 1 am therefore much more reserved about
introducing weight to the antidiscrimination framework than I am about disability.
262. The experience of transgender people seeking legal recognition of their transition can
provide an analogy to the level of intrusiveness of the judicial gaze. See Taylor Flynn, The Ties
That (Don't) Bind: Transgender Family Law and the Unmaking of Families, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS, supra note 251, at 32, 35-39 (arguing that judicial concern for the privacy of litigants
disappears when it comes to transgender and transsexual litigants, whose body, medical history,
and sex lives are subject to detailed scrutiny).
263. See generally Tirosh, supra note 122 (developing the argument about the advantage of
liberty-based justifications over discrimination-based protections in the context of appearance
claims).
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and that challenge the mainstream negation of fatness-that one's weight should
not be subjected to inquiries into whether it falls within the legal rubric of a
protected class.
Second, some jurisdictions, such as the State of Michigan, Washington D.C.,
or Santa Cruz, California, have already introduced appearance or weight as
forbidden grounds for discrimination. In the decade since introducing those laws,
we find surprisingly little litigation because plaintiffs do not file claims about
their weight-based discrimination.264 One likely reason for this failure to use the
law to mobilize fat rights is that fat plaintiffs are hesitant to expose themselves
publicly as fat. For example, if they file a weight discrimination claim, a simple
online search of their name would expose this fact, thus marking them publically
as fat. Perhaps potential fat plaintiffs are not ready to stably occupy the position
of people who have been wronged due to their weight. Perhaps they are not ready
to come out of the fat closet,265 a move that would entail claiming with
conviction that they are entitled to equal opportunity. This hypothesis is
supported by Solovay and Vade's observation that plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases who are unapologetic about their weight fare worse than
plaintiffs who tell the court that they know something is wrong about their body,
and they have tried every possible method for weight loss. 26 6
Another possible reason for the scant number of weight discrimination
lawsuits is that potential plaintiffs are unable to admit to themselves that they are
going to remain fat (that is, they internalize the future-grounded understanding of
fat identity as one that is only pending metamorphosis). The legal venue, then,
has thus far not proven to be effective or significant in preventing weight-based
discrimination. This Article takes a liberty-based approach to weight because it
does not raise the problems associated with employment discrimination
approaches.
4. Smoking, Skydiving, and Other Dangerous and Idiosyncratic Behaviors
My argument has normative implications for other behaviors that can be
categorized as body-centered and as dangerous to one's health, such as smoking
264. See Kristen, supra note 7, at 101 (indicating that "only eight to ten cases of weight-
related discrimination had been pursued" since the law reform in Michigan); see also RHODE, Supra
note 7, at 126 ("No jurisdiction [that explicitly prohibits appearance or weight discrimination] has
experienced the flood of frivolous litigation and business backlash that critics have predicted.");
Kristen, supra note 7, at 105-08 (indicating that no cases were litigated under Santa Cruz and San
Francisco's explicit ban on weight discrimination). For a recent statistical analysis of the little
change that obesity antidiscrimination laws made in the lives of fat legal subjects see Shinall, supra
note 5, at 20-30.
265. For a discussion of the fat closet, see infra Subsection III.C.2.
266. Sondra Solovay & Dylan Vade, No Apology: Shared Struggles in Fat and Transgender
Law, in THE FAT STUDIEs READER, supra note 11, 167, 167-69 (noting that for obesity, there is a
sense of moral failure that prevents accepting it as primarily a physiological disorder).
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or engaging in extreme sports.267 These behaviors, which are sometimes dubbed
"expensive tastes,"268 are controllable and unhealthy. Perhaps due to the cultural
grip of the dualistic approach to body and mind discussed above,269 the law
generally does not tend to protect physical behaviors that might be considered
eccentric or peculiar, while recognizing and protecting eccentric activities more
associated with the mind, such as speech or thought. I believe the account
provided here about the intimate and non-generalizable nature of embodied
experience can contribute to our understanding of the law's approach to such
practices. Smokers are attached to the sense of peace, pause, and release that a
cigarette provides. They often feel that their cigarette smoking time is a cherished
time and that there are no equivalent replacements for the feelings that smoking
provides for them.
Indeed, one of the implications of my argument is that we should begin to
develop a set of criteria for determining which activities or lifestyle choices merit
legal recognition and protection. These criteria will attempt to rate the extent to
which a certain bodily habit is close to the core of our person. Smoking, for
example, is different from eating in that it is not essential for survival. We cannot
completely abolish eating from our lives, and in that sense, regulation of smoking
would be ranked as farther from the core of our person than regulation of
eating-an activity inherent to human existence. Additionally, "the individual
makes the initial decision on whether to pick up the cigarette, [but a] person
struggling with obesity has often been dealing with weight issues since childhood
and did not really make the choice to become obese."2 70 Furthermore, smoking
poses direct damages to others in the proximity of the smoker, unlike being fat.
Another criterion would be the extent to which such bodily aspects of
experience define our sense of who we are, both "from the inside out" (for
ourselves) and "from the outside in" (by society's gaze). I mentioned earlier 27 1
that being fat today entails a persona; an entire set of characteristics that
seemingly emanate from body size. It reflects substantial qualities in the fat
person such as lack of self-control or laziness, but also perhaps a sense of humor
and ability to enjoy life.272 We are not there with regard to smoking or with
267. Like smoking, fat is sometimes theorized as contagious. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis
& James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years, 357 N. ENG. J.
MED. 370 (2007); Gina Kolata, Find Yourself Packing It On? Blame Friends, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/health/26fat.html.
268. On expensive tastes, see, for example, John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 168-69 (Amaryta Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); and
Simon Keller, Expensive Tastes and Distributive Justice, 28 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 529, 529-32
(2002).
269. See supra Section Il.A.
270. DeVries, supra note 7, at 165.
271. See supra Section I.A.
272. Even ascriptions of traits that seem positive still stereotype and lock fat people within a
particular social role. See, e.g., Gina Cordell & Carol Rambo Ronai, Identity Management Among
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extreme sports. Indeed smokers in the United States are today viewed as lacking
self-control, risking harm to themselves and others, and casting a burden on the
public budget with their expected illnesses. However, these attributes do not
amount to a sense that smokers are primarily defined by their smoking. There are
exceptions, but we usually say "his profession is X, he is age Y, and he is a
smoker." With fat people, their size comes earlier in our perceiving and talking
about them. This is another reason that there should not be an automatic leap
from the right to be fat to a right to smoke or to skydive.
In sum, it is certainly expected that the set of tools that would hopefully
develop in the process of broadening and applying the right to be fat could be
extrapolated to our way of thinking about other volitional bodily practices.
Determining whether the legal anchoring of a right to be fat should be extended
to other self-risking behaviors would depend on the extent to which the practice
in question is in close proximity to the core of the person and to one's sense of
self.
CONCLUSION
[W]e need to make our bodies just as central to our moral theorizing as they
are in our moral practices.
This Article has argued that American law's current constitutional
commitments to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity entail that it legally
recognize the right to be of any body size, including the right to be fat. This
analysis has traced the tradition of mind-body dualism as a central cause for our
ongoing neglect of body size as a significant domain of rights and presented
affirmative approaches to the fat body as an alternative to its prevalent negation.
Recognizing the recent critique of this dualism, and the potential contribution of
phenomenological accounts of body size, this Article has argued that we can no
longer omit the realm of bodily existence-of eating, moving and generally
existing corporeally-from the rights framework. 274
Being directly or indirectly targeted by laws and regulations that mark the fat
body as a body that merits correction makes it difficult for fat persons to maintain
a sense of dignity and of self worth. Current legal arrangements deprive fat
Overweight Women, in INTERPRETING WEIGHT: THE SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF FATNESS AND
THINNESS, supra note 93, at 29, 35-40 (providing a sociological account of resistance to the notion
that fat people are jolly or funny).
273. GAIL WEISS, BODY IMAGES: EMBODIMENT AS INTERCORPOREALITY 5 (1999).
274. Indeed, there are other aspects of embodied experience that such recognition would
render worthy of renewed consideration, such as nudity or dress style. The latter topic has been the
subject of legal scholarship in recent years. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 138-139. As I
maintained throughout this Article, focusing on weight is particularly timely and important because
recently it has become the focus of extensive and innovative legal regulation and because it is a
central axis of meaning in the lives of many individuals in American society.
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persons of a sense of equal entitlement to take part in the social, political, and
economical realms. Body size is intrinsically valuable both for one's sense of
personhood and for one's interactions with the physical and social world. The
antidiscrimination framework does not fully and accurately capture what is being
denied to fat people when their body size is targeted. Because embodied
existence is an important locus of human experience, liberty is a more
appropriate basis for the right to any body size. The legal protections that would
derive from liberty have the power to guard individuals against legal and social
interference with the intimate domain of body size and the practices associated
with it.
Indeed, the argument that our contemporary map of basic rights should open
up to include rights related to bodily practices in general and to body size in
particular is far from conceptually trivial or simple to apply. The implications of
a legal recognition of the right to be fat will unfold if and when such a right is
recognized. Until then, my hope is that it would no longer be possible to
offhandedly recruit the law to "the war against obesity." Every time the law is
invited to take part, whether directly or indirectly, in narrowing the scope of
liberties or in limiting the opportunities of fat people, lawmakers should pause to
consider fatness not merely through the reductive and impoverished medical and
instrumental vocabularies, but also through a humanist framework that
recognizes the potential richness and uniqueness of experiences of every body
size.
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